Duncan Pritchard

What is knowledge? -- Some preliminaries -- Types of knowledge -- Two basic requirements on knowledge : truth and belief -- Knowing versus merely getting it right -- A brief remark on truth -- The value of knowledge -- Why care about knowledge? -- The instrumental value of true belief -- The value of knowledge -- The statues of Daedalus -- Is some knowledge intrinsically valuable? -- Defining knowledge -- The problem of the criterion -- Methodism and particularism -- Knowledge as justifed true belief -- Gettier cases -- Responding to the gettier cases -- Back to the problem of the criterion -- The structure of knowledge -- Knowledge and justification -- The enigmatic nature of justification -- Agrippa's trilemma -- Infinitism -- Coherentism -- Foundationalism -- Rationality -- Rationality, justification, and knowledge -- Epistemic rationality and the goal of truth -- The goal(s) of epistemic rationality -- The (un)importance of epistemic rationality -- Rationality and responsibility -- Epistemic internalism/externalism -- Virtues and faculties -- Reliabilism -- A gettier problem for reliabilism -- Virtue epistemology -- Virtue epistemology and the externalism/internalism distinction -- Where does knowledge come from? -- Perception -- The problem of perceptual knowledge -- Indirect realism -- Idealism -- Transcendental idealism -- Direct realism -- Testimony and memory -- The problem of testimonial knowledge -- Reductionism -- Credulism -- The problem of memorial knowledge -- A priority and inference -- A priori and empirical knowledge -- The interdependence of A priori and empirical knowledge -- Introspective knowledge -- Deduction -- Induction -- Abduction -- The problem of induction -- The problem of induction -- Responding to the problem of induction -- Living with the problem of induction I : falsification -- Living with the problem of induction II : pragmatism -- A case study : moral knowledge -- The problem of moral knowledge -- Scepticism about moral facts -- Scepticism about moral knowledge -- The nature of moral knowledge (I) : classical foundationalism -- The nature of moral knowledge (II) : alternative conceptions -- Do we know anything at all? -- Scepticism about other minds -- The problem of other minds -- The argument from analogy -- A problem for the argument from analogy -- Two versions of the problem of other minds -- Perceiving someone else's mind -- Radical scepticism -- The radical sceptical paradox -- Scepticism and closure -- Mooreanism -- Contextualism -- Truth and objectivity -- Objectivity, anti-realism, and scepticism -- Truth as the goal of inquiry -- Authenticity and the value of truth -- Relativism.

What is knowledge? Where does it come from? What kinds of knowledge are there? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology. Both traditional issues and contemporary ideas are discussed in sixteen easily digestible chapters, each of which conclude with a useful summary of the main ideas discussed, study questions, annotated further reading and a guide to internet resources. Each chapter also features text boxes providing bite-sized summaries of key concepts and major philosophers, and clear and interesting examples are used throughout. The book concludes with an annotated guide to general introductions to epistemology, a glossary of key terms, and a summary of the main examples used in epistemology, This an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for undergraduates coming to philosophy for the first time. The third edition has been revised and updated throughout and features two new chapters, on religious knowledge and scientific knowledge, as part of a whole new section on what kinds of knowledge there are. In addition, the text as a whole has been refreshed to keep it up to date with current developments.

It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and inter-relationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate.

I examine one key way in which the problem of radical scepticism is motivated via an appeal to an infallibility thesis—as expressed, for example, in the work of Peter Unger—and highlight how this construal of the sceptical problem presupposes a certain view about epistemic luck. Furthermore, I explore the manner in which an infallibilism-based scepticism gives rise to the kind of template-sceptical argument that is the focus of much of the contemporary discussion of scepticism and which turns on the ‘closure’ principle that knowledge is ‘closed’ under known entailments.

I discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all. Crucially, however, I claim that it is the specific challenge posed by reflective luck that is central to the sceptical problem, and yet there is a fundamental sense in which this type of epistemic luck is ineliminable. I argue that it is this sceptical problem that informs the Pyrrhonian sceptical challenge of antiquity. Moreover, I further maintain that the so-called ‘metaepistemological’ sceptical challenge that features prominently in contemporary epistemological debate—as advanced, for example, by Barry Stroud and Richard Fumerton—is best understood in terms of the specific sceptical problem regarding the ineliminability of reflective luck.

I maintain that the neo-Moorean response to scepticism is unable, by itself at any rate, to completely resolve the sceptical problem. The reason for this is that the contemporary discussion of scepticism has misunderstood what the source of this problem is, and thus even the most plausible of the main anti-sceptical theories in the literature misses its intended target. To illustrate this, I contrast the closure-based template sceptical argument with its analogue argument expressed in terms of the ‘underdetermination’ principle that can be found in ancient Pyrrhonian sceptical writings, and which merely demands that one’s evidence should favour one’s beliefs over incompatible alternatives. I show how the latter argument brings to the fore just what is wrong with the contemporary debate regarding scepticism, which is its failure to respond to the specifically internalist and evidentialist character of the sceptical doubt.

I examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ luck—can be handled with a modest ‘relevant alternatives’ account of knowledge that is specifically defined so that it counters this type of epistemic luck. As I explain, such a theory is essentially a version of the safety-based neo-Moorean thesis that we looked at in Ch. 3. I develop this view by considering some of the main examples that are discussed in epistemology—such as Gettier examples, the ‘lottery’ puzzle, and ‘barn façade’ examples—and show how the neo-Moorean account can in each case generate the right result. Along the way the formulation of this anti-veritic-luck thesis is refined in response to potential challenges that might be presented to the view. Significantly, however, the chapter closes by arguing that there is a second species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘reflective luck’-that is epistemically problematic and that is not dealt with by the neo-Moorean account.

I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of one’s anti-sceptical strategy, one should reject both the arguments for non-closure and for attributer contextualism, and advance, instead, a version of neo-Mooreanism that turns on the so-called ‘safety’ condition on knowledge. I explore the implications of this approach for the sceptical problem, including the manner in which it needs to be distinguished from the type of response to scepticism that is associated with G. E. Moore’s famous proof of an external world. A key component of this argument in this respect is an account of the conversational rules that govern our ascriptions of knowledge that can do justice to the intuitions that motivate attributer contextualism, while also explaining why the kind of anti-sceptical assertions made by Moore are so problematic. As regards the latter, I enlist elements of Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore’s response to the sceptic from On Certainty. I conclude that what these considerations highlight is a deep and important truth about the structure of reasons.

I outline how an analysis of epistemic luck has ramifications for the supposedly parallel debate regarding moral luck. Focusing on the two classic papers on moral luck by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams, I examine the arguments and examples put forward in this regard and highlight how a primarily epistemological analysis can be put into service to cast light on the corresponding moral debate. In particular, I show that these authors fail to distinguish a specifically moral problem, and that what difficulties they do highlight are parasitic on the problem of reflective epistemic luck. I conclude that there is a strong prima facie case for thinking that there is no such thing as moral luck, and that the only reason why many think that there is because they are confusing the non-existent problem of moral luck with the entirely genuine problem of reflective epistemic luck.

I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, and examine the so-called ‘sensitivity’ condition on knowledge that they advocate in this respect. I then evaluate this approach in the light of the attributer contextualist response to scepticism, as developed by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis. In both cases I argue that these anti-sceptical approaches suffer by being motivated by diverse and incompatible intuitions, principally as regards their ambivalent endorsement of epistemological externalism. An exploration of the relationship between the sceptical problem and the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction is thus presented.

I discuss the difficulty posed by the ineliminability of reflective epistemic luck and offer one way of responding to this difficulty. I begin by considering Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge from On Certainty and consider, in particular, the specific claims he makes about the so-called ’hinge’ propositions that contextually determine the nature of epistemic evaluation. I claim that what underlies Wittgenstein’s remarks in this respect is a certain view about the ultimately groundless nature of our reason-giving practices. This way of thinking about the structure of reasons is, I argue, correlative to the thesis described here regarding the ineliminability of reflective luck. Moreover, I contend that it is our implicit philosophical recognition of this problem that gives rise to a certain kind of general anxiety about our epistemic position that I refer to as epistemic angst. This contention is further illustrated by critically evaluating John McDowell’s content externalist response to scepticism that incorporates a strongly anti-sceptical account of reasons. I close on a positive note by arguing that while there is no epistemic response available to the problem posed by reflective luck, there is a plausible pragmatic resolution to this difficulty. Indeed, I claim that an anti-sceptical thesis of this sort can be discerned from Wittgenstein’s own fragmentary remarks on scepticism, and I develop such a view in the light of Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic response to the problem of inductive scepticism, which I maintain is cast along similar lines.

Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects for three such proposals in this regard: a classical epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, a classical epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism, and a non-classical McDowellian epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, and maintain that the last two of these proposals (both of which make appeal to a disjunctivist account of perception, broadly conceived) merit further exploration. Indeed, I claim that a suitably qualified version of neo-Mooreanism would actually sit quite well with the general philosophical motivations behind other key anti-sceptical views and I argue that given this fact neo-Mooreanism is actually at a dialectical advantage relative to other views when it comes to dealing with the sceptical problem as it is typically conceived.

The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memory in old partners, problem-solving by juries, and the behaviors of hiring committees, scientific research teams, and intelligence agencies. This volume attempts to further our understanding of socially extended knowledge while also exploring its potential practical and societal impact by inviting perspectives not just from philosophy but from cognitive science, computer science, Web science, and cybernetics too. Contributions to the volume mostly fall within two broad categories: (i) foundational issues within socially extended epistemology (including elaborations on, defences and criticisms of core aspects of socially extended epistemology), and (ii) applications and new directions, where themes in socially extended epistemology are connected to these other areas of research. The volume is accordingly divided into two parts corresponding to these broad categories. The topics themselves are of great conceptual interest, and wider interdisciplinary perspectives suggest many connections with social concerns and policy-making.

According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the ‘hinge’ role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein’s proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.

The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements – i.e. disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner