•  24
    Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues
    In Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 2--462. 2000.
    I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive responsibility for one’s beliefs. I take a critical look at some of the recent ‘virtue epistemologies’ that have been put forward in the recent literature which define knowledge in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties. More specifically, I contrast broadly externalist construals of t…Read more
  •  203
    The Modal Account of Luck
    Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5): 594-619. 2014.
    This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work . In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions …Read more
  •  203
    Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2): 236-247. 2013.
    A certain conception of the relevance of virtue epistemology to the philosophy of education is set out. On this conception, while the epistemic goal of education might initially be promoting the pupil's cognitive success, it should ultimately move on to the development of the pupil's cognitive agency. A continuum of cognitive agency is described, on which it is ultimately cognitive achievement, and thus understanding, which is the epistemic goal of education. This is contrasted with a view on wh…Read more
  •  192
    The Structure of Sceptical Arguments
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218). 2005.
    It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is 'closed' under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles available to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accor…Read more
  •  2
    Notes
    In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 189-216. 2016.
  •  401
    Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemology
    In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
  •  18
    MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 38 (4): 455-458. 2015.
    No abstract available.
  •  30
    Knowledge or just a lucky guess?
    The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55): 66-71. 2011.
    Our judgements about luck – and about related things, like risk – are for the most part sensitive to what is happening in close possible worlds rather than probabilities.
  •  2
    Bearing witness
    The Philosophers' Magazine 32 80-82. 2005.
  •  133
    One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell's view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argum…Read more
  •  180
    Scepticism and dreaming
    Philosophia 28 (1-4): 373-390. 2001.
    In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first plac…Read more
  •  41
    Extended knowledge
    The Philosophers' Magazine 72 93-94. 2016.