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328What is This Thing Called Knowledge?Routledge. 2006.What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism. Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, including: the value of knowledge the structure of knowledge virtue…Read more
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101What is This Thing Called Philosophy? (edited book)Routledge. 2015._What is this thing called Philosophy?_ is the definitive textbook for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement. The core areas of philosophy covered are: Ethics Poli…Read more
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57Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of NewmanIn Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas, De Gruyter. pp. 197-216. 2015.
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41IntroductionSynthese 158 (3): 273-275. 2007.I introduce the topic of this special issue of Synthese, and give an overview of the articles collected here.
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8Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical TheoriesFacta Philosophica 3 (1): 101-26. 2001.
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17Knowledge and ValueIn Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010.
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58The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue EpistemologyIn Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, Routledge. pp. 248--269. 2013.
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11CoherentismIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2010.
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136Epistemological disjunctivismOxford University Press. 2012.Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.
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264Zagzebski on RationalityEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 39--46. 2014.This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering…Read more
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1454Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and MetaepistemologyHumanities 2 (3): 351-368. 2013.We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a …Read more
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21Extended Epistemology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.One of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition, whereby features of a subject's cognitive environment can in certain conditions become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea.... The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the vo…Read more
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147Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeatSynthese 195 (7): 3065-3077. 2018.This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; how certain kinds of epistemic de…Read more
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37Review of Christian Beyer, and Alex Burri (eds.), Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6). 2008.
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215Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic LuckTheoria 73 (2): 173-178. 2007.It is argued that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once o…Read more
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109A Defence of Quasi-reductionism in the Epistemology of TestimonyPhilosophica 78 (2). 2006.Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and that knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial knowledge. In particular, it is argued that this conception of knowledge motivates a new kind of proposal B qu…Read more
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238The nature and value of knowledge: three investigationsOxford University Press. 2010.The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?…Read more
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19Preface to the Cavell SymposiumInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1): 1. 2015._ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 1 - 1 A preface to a symposium devoted to Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, featuring papers by Peter Fosl, Andrea Kern, and Stephen Mulhall
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23Chapter 6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Closure-Based Radical SkepticismIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 144-166. 2016.
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278The epistemology of testimonyPhilosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing this, forms the belief that the house is on fire and consequently exits the building at speed. C…Read more
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2000
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |