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Contrastivism, scepticism, and evidenceIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 22--305. 2008.
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272Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin EarthEuropean Journal of Philosophy 22 (3): 335-357. 2011.A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is a…Read more
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38Chapter 4. Hinge CommitmentsIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 89-120. 2016.
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105Engel on pragmatic encroachment and epistemic valueSynthese 194 (5): 1477-1486. 2017.I discuss Engel’s critique of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology and his related discussion of epistemic value. While I am sympathetic to Engel’s remarks on the former, I think he makes a crucial misstep when he relates this discussion to the latter topic. The goal of this paper is to offer a better articulation of the relationship between these two epistemological issues, with the ultimate goal of lending further support to Engel’s scepticism about pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. As…Read more
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62Review: Beyond 'Justification': Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (review)Mind 115 (458): 387-389. 2006.
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292Virtue epistemology and epistemic luckMetaphilosophy 34 (1/2): 106--130. 2003.The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been conc…Read more
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450McDowellian neo-mooreanismIn Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 283--310. 2006.It is claimed that McDowell’s treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical internalist and externalist construals of neo-Mooreanism. I here evaluate the prospects for a McDowellian neo-Mooreanism and, in doing so, offer further support for the view
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61Closure and contextAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2). 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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174Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic angstAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2). 2005.A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best …Read more
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21Extended Epistemology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.One of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition, whereby features of a subject's cognitive environment can in certain conditions become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea.... The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the vo…Read more
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149Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeatSynthese 195 (7): 3065-3077. 2018.This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; how certain kinds of epistemic de…Read more
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1465Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and MetaepistemologyHumanities 2 (3): 351-368. 2013.We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a …Read more
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109A Defence of Quasi-reductionism in the Epistemology of TestimonyPhilosophica 78 (2). 2006.Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and that knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial knowledge. In particular, it is argued that this conception of knowledge motivates a new kind of proposal B qu…Read more
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37Review of Christian Beyer, and Alex Burri (eds.), Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6). 2008.
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218Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic LuckTheoria 73 (2): 173-178. 2007.It is argued that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once o…Read more
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238The nature and value of knowledge: three investigationsOxford University Press. 2010.The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?…Read more
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19Preface to the Cavell SymposiumInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1): 1. 2015._ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 1 - 1 A preface to a symposium devoted to Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, featuring papers by Peter Fosl, Andrea Kern, and Stephen Mulhall
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227Wittgenstein on ScepticismIn Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press. 2011.An overview of Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism in On Certainty is offered, especially with regard to the notion of a “hinge proposition”. Several possible interpretations of the anti-sceptical import of this text are then critically assessed, with each view situated within the contemporary literature on scepticism.
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52Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossiblesSynthese 171 (3): 357-358. 2009.Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2000
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |