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320What is This Thing Called Knowledge?Routledge. 2006.What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism. Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, including: the value of knowledge the structure of knowledge virtue…Read more
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101What is This Thing Called Philosophy? (edited book)Routledge. 2015._What is this thing called Philosophy?_ is the definitive textbook for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement. The core areas of philosophy covered are: Ethics Poli…Read more
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57Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of NewmanIn Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas, De Gruyter. pp. 197-216. 2015.
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41IntroductionSynthese 158 (3): 273-275. 2007.I introduce the topic of this special issue of Synthese, and give an overview of the articles collected here.
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8Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical TheoriesFacta Philosophica 3 (1): 101-26. 2001.
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17Knowledge and ValueIn Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010.
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58The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue EpistemologyIn Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, Routledge. pp. 248--269. 2013.
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11CoherentismIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2010.
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136Epistemological disjunctivismOxford University Press. 2012.Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.
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256Zagzebski on RationalityEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 39--46. 2014.This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering…Read more
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205Knowledge, luck and lotteriesIn Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave-macmillan. 2007.It is a platitude in epistemology to say that knowledge excludes luck. Indeed, if one can show that an epistemological theory allows ‘lucky’ knowledge, then that usually suffices to warrant one in straightforwardly rejecting the view. Even despite the prevalence of this intuition, however, very few commentators have explored what it means to say that knowledge is incompatible with luck. In particular, no commentator, so far as I am aware, has offered an account of what luck is and on this basis …Read more
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814Recent Work on Radical SkepticismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3): 215-257. 2002.This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the k…Read more
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83Evidentialism, internalism, disjunctivismIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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157Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck, revisitedMetaphilosophy 39 (1). 2008.In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at le…Read more
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1198Knowledge‐How and Cognitive AchievementPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1): 181-199. 2015.According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propos…Read more
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160Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic valueAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1): 19-41. 2008.It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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212Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problemPhilosophical Studies 172 (1): 93-111. 2015.A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated. It is argued that a range of superficially distinct cases which are meant to pose problems for anti-luck epistemology are in fact related in significant ways. It is claimed that with t…Read more
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222Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our BelievingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3): 70-90. 2016.Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two-pronged, integrated, underc…Read more
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61Extended Knowledge and Social EpistemologySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8): 105-120. 2013.The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radica…Read more
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241Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discriminationNoûs 44 (2): 245-268. 2010.This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recog…Read more
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218Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility ManoeuvresIn Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Mit Press. pp. 85-104. 2010.Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb 'knows' is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form "S knows that p" can be dependent upon the ascriber's context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of certain assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposin…Read more
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6IntroductionIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-8. 2016.
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210Robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualismPacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1): 84-103. 2012.According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as age…Read more
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506 ABSTRACT. I outline GrecoÕs response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to 7 epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. 8 I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available 9 which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and..
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2000
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |