•  30
    Perhaps the most dominant anti‐sceptical proposal in recent literature –advanced by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis –is the contextualist response to radical scepticism. Central to the contextualist thesis is the claim that, unlike other non‐contextualist anti‐sceptical theories, contextualism offers a dissolution of the sceptical paradox that respects our common sense epistemological intuitions. Taking DeRose's view as representative of the contextualist position, it…Read more
  •  17
    Some Recent Work in Epistemology
    Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217): 604-613. 2004.
  •  34
    Epistemic Luck
    Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223): 284-289. 2006.
  •  31
    McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism
    European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 273-294. 2003.
  •  3
    The truth about truth (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 30 86-87. 2005.
  •  7
    Moral and Epistemic Virtues
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2004.
    This volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology. A collection of cutting edge articles by leading figures in the field of virtue theory including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff and Miranda Fricker. The first book to combine papers on both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Deals with key topics in recent epistemological and ethical debate.
  •  115
    Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding
    In Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives From Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, . pp. 272-292. 2017.
    In recent work, Mark Alfano and Jennifer Saul have put forward a similar kind of provocative sceptical challenge. Both appeal to recent literature in empirical psychology to show that our judgments across a wide range of cases are riddled with unreliable cognitive heuristics and biases. Likewise, they both conclude that we know a lot less than we have hitherto supposed, at least on standard conceptions of what knowledge involves. It is argued that even if one grants the empirical claims that Sau…Read more
  •  98
    A familiar point in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement is that in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer the epistemically virtuous agent should adopt a stance of intellectual humility. That is, the virtuous agent should take a conciliatory stance and reduce her commitment to the proposition under dispute. In this paper, we ask the question of how such intellectual humility would manifest itself in a corresponding peer disagreement regarding knowledge-how. We a…Read more
  •  10
    The Philosophy of Luck (edited book)
    with Lee John Whittington
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2015.
    "First published as Metaphilosophy volume 45, nos. 4-5, except for 'Luck as risk and the lack of control account of luck,' first published in Metaphilosophy volume 46, no. 2 "--Title page vers.
  •  332
    What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism. Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, including: the value of knowledge the structure of knowledge virtue…Read more
  •  29
    Summary
    Analysis 75 (4): 589-595. 2015.
  •  101
    What is This Thing Called Philosophy? (edited book)
    Routledge. 2015.
    _What is this thing called Philosophy?_ is the definitive textbook for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement. The core areas of philosophy covered are: Ethics Poli…Read more
  •  57
    Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman
    In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas, De Gruyter. pp. 197-216. 2015.
  •  41
    Introduction
    Synthese 158 (3): 273-275. 2007.
    I introduce the topic of this special issue of Synthese, and give an overview of the articles collected here.
  •  11
    Coherentism
    In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2010.
  •  138
    Epistemological disjunctivism
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.
  •  4
    Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  291
    Zagzebski on Rationality
    with Shane Ryan
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 39--46. 2014.
    This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering…Read more
  •  157
    Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck, revisited
    Metaphilosophy 39 (1). 2008.
    In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at le…Read more
  •  19
    Preface to the Cavell Symposium
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1): 1. 2015.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 1 - 1 A preface to a symposium devoted to Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, featuring papers by Peter Fosl, Andrea Kern, and Stephen Mulhall
  •  238
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?…Read more
  •  30
    Greco on scepticism – a critical discussion
    with Cornelis Van Putten
    Erkenntnis 62 (2): 277-284. 2005.
  •  23
    Editors' Note
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1): 1-2. 2011.
  •  132
    Two of the main forms of anti-scepticism in the contemporary literature—namely, neo-Mooreanism and attributer contextualism—share a common claim, which is that we are, contra the sceptic, able to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses. This paper begins by surveying the relative merits of these views when it comes to dealing with the standard closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem that is focussed on the possession of knowledge. It is argued, however, that it is not enough to simpl…Read more
  •  278
    The epistemology of testimony
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
    Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing this, forms the belief that the house is on fire and consequently exits the building at speed. C…Read more