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92Explanation and metaphysical controversyIn Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Univ of Minnesota Pr. pp. 13--220. 1989.
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287Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of NaturalismIn Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Cambridge University Press. pp. 59--105. 1998.
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134Noncognitivism about rationality: Benefits, costs, and an alternativePhilosophical Issues 4 36-51. 1993.
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121The Critical Project Today (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1): 201-209. 2012.
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3Morality, ideology, and reflection, or the duck sits yetIn Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, Reflection, and Ideology, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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9How to Engage Reason: The Problem of RegressIn R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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9On the hypothetical and non-hypothetical in reasoning about belief and actionIn Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 53--79. 1997.
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4202Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of moralityPhilosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2): 134-171. 1984.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
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428The affective dog and its rational tale: intuition and attunementEthics 124 (4): 813-859. 2014.Intuition—spontaneous, nondeliberative assessment—has long been indispensable in theoretical and practical philosophy alike. Recent research by psychologists and experimental philosophers has challenged our understanding of the nature and authority of moral intuitions by tracing them to “fast,” “automatic,” “button-pushing” responses of the affective system. This view of the affective system contrasts with a growing body of research in affective neuroscience which suggests that it is instead a f…Read more
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283To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
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57Broadening the base for bringing cognitive psychology to bear on ethicsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 27-28. 1994.
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236Normative force and normative freedom: Hume and Kant, but not Hume versus KantRatio 12 (4). 1999.Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marria…Read more
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238How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of UtilitarianismMidwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1): 398-416. 1988.
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202That Obscure Object, DesireProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86 (2): 22-46. 2012.
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4Morality, Ideology, and ReflectionIn Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, Reflection, and Ideology, Clarendon Press. 2000.
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119Humean theory of practical rationalityIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 265--81. 2006.David Hume famously criticized rationalist theories of practical reason, arguing that reason alone is incapable of yielding action, and that some passionate element must be supplied. Contemporary theories of Humean inspiration develop a causal-explanatory model of action in terms of the joint operation of two distinct mental states: beliefs and desires, one inert and representational, the other dynamic. Such neo-Humean theories claim that since desires, unlike beliefs, are not subject to direct …Read more
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37Darwinian building blocksJournal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2): 1-2. 2000.Although the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and the is/ought distinction have often been invoked as definitive grounds for rejecting any attempt to bring evolutionary thought to bear on ethics, they are better interpreted as warnings than as absolute barriers. Our moral concepts themselves -- e.g. the principle that ‘ought implies can’ -- require us to ask whether human psychology is capable of impartial empathetic thought and motivation characteristic of normative systems that could count as moral. As …Read more
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21Psi: Anomalous correlation or anomalous explanation?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 605. 1987.
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347A deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanationPhilosophy of Science 45 (2): 206-226. 1978.It has been the dominant view that probabilistic explanations of particular facts must be inductive in character. I argue here that this view is mistaken, and that the aim of probabilistic explanation is not to demonstrate that the explanandum fact was nomically expectable, but to give an account of the chance mechanism(s) responsible for it. To this end, a deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation is developed and defended. Such a model has application only when the probabilities…Read more
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |