• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Kendall Walton

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    62
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    3
  •  News and Updates
    46

 More details
  • University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Aesthetics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Aesthetics
  • All publications (62)
  •  121
    Real ImaginingsMemesis As Make-Believe
    with Patrick Maynard
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 389. 1991.
    Other Academic Areas, MiscVisual Arts
  •  1
    Marie-laure Ryan
    Semiotica 103 (3/4): 349-367. 1995.
    Semiotics
  •  358
    On Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-BelieveMemesis As Make-Believe
    with Noel Carroll
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 383. 1991.
    Photography
  •  245
    Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2): 161-166. 1990.
    Aesthetics
  •  309
    Aesthetic Properties: Context Dependent and Perceptual
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 78 (1): 79-84. 2020.
    The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 78, Issue 1, Page 79-84, Winter 2020.
    Aesthetic Qualities, Misc
  •  72
    Metaphor and prop oriented make-believe
    In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  150
    Comments on Mimesis as Make-BelieveMemesis As Make-Believe (review)
    with George M. Wilson
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 395. 1991.
  •  217
    A Note on Mimesis as Make-BelieveMemesis As Make-Believe
    with Richard Wollheim
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 401. 1991.
    Aesthetics
  •  663
    Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make‐Believe
    European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1): 39-57. 1993.
    Peer Reviewed.
    Metaphor
  •  1
    Conceptual Schemes: A Study of Linguistic Relativity and Related Philosophical Problems
    Dissertation, Cornell University. 1967.
    Epistemic Relativism, Misc
  •  194
    Comment on Catherine Wilson, 'Grief and the Poet'
    British Journal of Aesthetics 53 (1): 113-115. 2013.
    Literature and Emotion
  •  937
    Empathy, Imagination, and Phenomenal Concepts
    In Kendall L. Walton (ed.), In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-16. 2015.
    I propose a way of understanding empathy on which it does not necessarily involve any-thing like thinking oneself into another’s shoes, or any imagining at all. Briefly, the empa-thizer uses an aspect of her own mental state as a sample, expressed by means of a phenomenal concept, to understand the other person. This account does a better job of explaining the connection between empathetic experiences and the objects of empathy than most traditional ones do. And it helps to clarify the relations…Read more
    I propose a way of understanding empathy on which it does not necessarily involve any-thing like thinking oneself into another’s shoes, or any imagining at all. Briefly, the empa-thizer uses an aspect of her own mental state as a sample, expressed by means of a phenomenal concept, to understand the other person. This account does a better job of explaining the connection between empathetic experiences and the objects of empathy than most traditional ones do. And it helps to clarify the relations among different varieties of empathy and empathy-like experiences, including empathy with fictional characters.
    Epistemology of Mind
  •  22
    On the (so-called) puzzle of imaginative resistance
    In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 137-148. 2006.
    Imaginative ResistanceLiterature and Emotion
  •  2805
    Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality (I)
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68 27-50. 2015 [1994].
    Imaginative ResistanceAesthetics and EthicsTruth in Fiction
  •  90
    Are beliefs necessary to acting rationally?
    Mind 83 (329): 100-102. 1974.
    Mental States and Processes
  •  41
    Memesis As Make-Believe
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 407-411. 1991.
  •  1
    Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts
    Philosophy 66 (258): 527-529. 1990.
  •  224
    Depiction, perception, and imagination: Responses to Richard Wollheim
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (1). 2002.
    DepictionAesthetic PerceptionAesthetic Imagination
  •  3
    The presentation and portrayal of sound patterns
    In J. O. Urmson, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik & C. C. W. Taylor (eds.), Human agency: language, duty, and value: philosophical essays in honor of J.O. Urmson, Stanford University Press. pp. 230-257. 1988.
    Ontology of Music
  •  55
    Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content
    In Richard Heinrich, Elisabeth Nemeth, Wolfram Pichler & David Wagner (eds.), Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - N.S. 17, De Gruyter. pp. 395-408. 2011.
    Depiction
  •  121
    Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts
    Philosophical Review 102 (3): 440. 1993.
    TheaterFictional CharactersVisual ArtsTruth in FictionLiteratureDepiction
  •  153
    Not a leg to stand on the roof on
    Journal of Philosophy 70 (19): 725-726. 1973.
  •  216
    Languages of art: An emendation
    Philosophical Studies 22 (5-6). 1971.
    In nelson goodman's "languages of art" a symbol system must be 'finitely differentiated', both syntactically and semantically, to count as a 'notation'. goodman's formulations of these differentiation requirements are seriously defective. it is shown that most of the examples of systems which he claims fail these requirements, do not fail them as they are stated. reformulations of the two requirements are offered, which accord with the examples and seem otherwise acceptable
    Aesthetic Symbol Systems
  •  135
    Fearing fictionally
    In Alex Neill & Aaron Ridley (eds.), Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates, Routledge. pp. 257. 2013.
    Aesthetics
  •  310
    What is abstract about the art of music?
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (3): 351-364. 1988.
    AestheticsMusical Experience
  •  3
    Seeing-In and seeing fictionally
    In J. Hopkins & A. Savile (eds.), Psychoanalysis Mind and Art, Blackwell. pp. 281--291. 1992.
    Aesthetic PerceptionAesthetic ImaginationAesthetic ExperienceDepiction
  •  385
    Aesthetics—what? Why? And wherefore?
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (2). 2007.
    It is a very great honor to address my friends and colleagues as president of the American Society for Aesthetics, an organization that plays a unique role in a field that is, at once, a major traditional branch of philosophy and also central to disciplines often regarded as remote from philosophy, as well as depending crucially on their contributions
    History of Aesthetics
  •  476
    Précis of mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the representational arts
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 379-382. 1991.
    Imagination and PretenseDepictionTruth in Fiction
  •  141
    Meiosis, hyperbole, irony
    Philosophical Studies (1): 00-00. 2015.
    It is tempting to assume that understatement and overstatement, meiosis and hyperbole, are analogous figures of speech, differing only in whether the speaker represents a quantity as larger, or as smaller, than she means to claim that it is. But these tropes have hugely different roles in conversation. Understatement is akin to irony, perhaps a species of it. Overstatement is an entirely different kettle of fish. Things get interestingly messy when we notice that to overstate how large or expen…Read more
    It is tempting to assume that understatement and overstatement, meiosis and hyperbole, are analogous figures of speech, differing only in whether the speaker represents a quantity as larger, or as smaller, than she means to claim that it is. But these tropes have hugely different roles in conversation. Understatement is akin to irony, perhaps a species of it. Overstatement is an entirely different kettle of fish. Things get interestingly messy when we notice that to overstate how large or expensive or distant something is, is to understate how small or inexpensive or close it is, and vice versa. So it may seem, anyway. I propose an account of the two tropes that counts some utterances, in their conversational contexts, as overstatements of a quantity but not understatements of the opposite quantity, and other utterances as understatements only. This account shows why understatement is closely related to irony and overstatement is not. Although overstatement and understatement (or irony) are very different, they are sometimes combined. An understatement of one quantity may be an overstatement of a different one.
    Philosophy of Language, Misc
  •  79
    In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    In fifteen essays-one new, two newly revised and expanded, three with new postscripts-Kendall L. Walton wrestles with philosophical issues concerning music, metaphor, empathy, existence, fiction, and expressiveness in the arts. These subjects are intertwined in striking and surprising ways. By exploring connections among them, appealing sometimes to notions of imagining oneself in shoes different from one's own, Walton creates a wide-ranging mosaic of innovative insights.
    EthicsPhilosophy of Music
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback