•  36
    Gleason's theorem is not constructively provable
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (2). 1993.
  •  24
    Determination and Logical Truth
    Journal of Philosophy 82 (11): 607-616. 1985.
  •  68
    Along with Frege, Russell maintained an absolutist stance regarding the subject matter of mathematics, revealed rather than imposed, or proposed, by logical analysis. The Fregean definition of cardinal number, for example, is viewed as (essentially) correct, not merely adequate for mathematics. And Dedekind’s “structuralist” views come in for criticism in the Principles. But, on reflection, Russell also flirted with views very close to a (different) version of structuralism. Main varieties of modern…Read more
  •  191
    Predicativism as a Philosophical Position
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3 295-312. 2004.
  •  49
    Neither categorical nor set-theoretic foundations
    Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (1): 16-23. 2013.
    First we review highlights of the ongoing debate about foundations of category theory, beginning with Fefermantop-down” approach, where particular categories and functors need not be explicitly defined. Possible reasons for resisting the proposal are offered and countered. The upshot is to sustain a pluralism of foundations along lines actually foreseen by Feferman (1977), something that should be welcomed as a way of resolving this long-standing debate
  •  245
    The classical continuum without points
    Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (3): 488-512. 2013.
    We develop a point-free construction of the classical one- dimensional continuum, with an interval structure based on mereology and either a weak set theory or logic of plural quantification. In some respects this realizes ideas going back to Aristotle,although, unlike Aristotle, we make free use of classical "actual infinity". Also, in contrast to intuitionistic, Bishop, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, we follow classical analysis in allowing partitioning of our "gunky line" into mutually ex…Read more
  •  32
    1995–1996 annual meeting of the association for symbolic logic
    with Tomek Bartoszynski, Harvey Friedman, Bakhadyr Khoussainov, Phokion G. Kolaitis, Richard Shore, Charles Steinhorn, Mirna Dzamonja, Itay Neeman, and Slawomir Solecki
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (4): 448-472. 1996.
  •  68
    Standard proofs of generalized Bell theorems, aiming to restrict stochastic, local hidden-variable theories for quantum correlation phenomena, employ as a locality condition the requirement of conditional stochastic independence. The connection between this and the no-superluminary-action requirement of the special theory of relativity has been a topic of controversy. In this paper, we introduce an alternative locality condition for stochastic theories, framed in terms of the models of such a th…Read more
  •  8
    From Constructive to Predicative Mathematics
    In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), The Cosmos of Science, University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 6--153. 1997.
  •  6
    Reply to Comments of Solomon Ferferman
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3 325-328. 2004.