Alan Love

Scientific explanation is a perennial topic in philosophy of science, but the literature has fragmented into specialized discussions in different scientific disciplines. An increasing attention to scientific practice by philosophers is (in part) responsible for this fragmentation and has put pressure on criteria of adequacy for philosophical accounts of explanation, usually demanding some form of pluralism. This commentary examines the arguments offered by Fagan and Woody with respect to explanation and understanding in scientific practice. I begin by scrutinizing Fagan's concept of collaborative explanation, highlighting its distinctive advantages and expressing concern about several of its assumptions. Then I analyze Woody's attempt to reorient discussions of scientific explanation around functional considerations, elaborating on the wider implications of this methodological recommendation. I conclude with reflections on synergies and tensions that emerge when the two papers are juxtaposed and how these draw attention to critical issues that confront ongoing philosophical analyses of scientific explanation.

Alan C. LoveDarwinian calisthenicsAn athlete engages in calisthenics as part of basic training and as a preliminary to more advanced or intense activity. Whether it is stretching, lunges, crunches, or push-ups, routine calisthenics provide a baseline of strength and flexibility that prevent a variety of injuries that might otherwise be incurred. Peter Bowler has spent 40 years doing Darwinian calisthenics, researching and writing on the development of evolutionary ideas with special attention to Darwin and subsequent filiations among scientists exploring evolution . Therefore, we would expect that when Bowler engages in a counterfactual history—imagining a world without Darwin—he is able to avoid historical injury and generate novel insights. My assessment is that the results are mixed. Before we can see why, it is necessary to walk briskly through the main contours of his argument.Bowler begins with an apologia for a counterfactual appr ..

Comprehending the origin of marine invertebrate larvae remains a key domain of research for evolutionary biologists, including the repeated origin of direct developmental modes in echinoids. In order to address the latter question, we surveyed existing evidence on relationships of homology between the ectoderm territories of two closely related sea urchin species in the genus Heliocidaris that differ in their developmental mode. Additionally, we explored a recently articulated idea about homology called ‘organizational homology’ (Muller 2003. In: Muller GB, Newman SA, editors. Origination of organismal form: beyond the gene in developmental and evolutionary biology. Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press. p 51–69. ) in the context of this specific empirical case study. Applying the perspective of organizational homology to our experimental system of congeneric echinoids has led us to a new hypothesis concerning the ectoderm evolution in these species. The extravestibular ectoderm of the direct developer Heliocidaris erythrogramma is a novel developmental territory that arose as a fusion of the oral and aboral ectoderm territories found in indirect developing echinoids such as Heliocidaris tuberculata. This hypothesis instantiates a theoretical principle concerning the origin of developmental modules, ‘integration’, which has been neglected because the opposite theoretical principle, ‘parcellation’, is more readily observable in events such as gene duplication and divergence (Wagner 1996. Am Zool 36:36–43). J. Exp. Zool. (Mol. Dev. Evol.) 306B:18– 34, 2006.

Although natural philosophers have long been interested in individuality, it has been of interest to contemporary philosophers of biology because of its role in different aspects of evolutionary biology. These debates include whether species are individuals or classes, what counts as a unit of selection, and how transitions in individuality occur evolutionarily. Philosophical analyses are often conducted in terms of metaphysics (“what is an individual?”), rather than epistemology (“how can and do researchers conceptualize individuals so as to address some of their scientific goals?”). We review several philosophical distinctions in order to shift attention from metaphysics to epistemology. Many controversies involve epistemological differences rather than metaphysical disagreement. This implies that a pluralist stance about individuality in biology is warranted and has metaphysical consequences because the pluralism emerges from the diversity of scientific interests that investigate the complexity of living phenomena.