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113Substance and procedure in theories of prudential valueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3). 2007.In this paper I argue that the debate between subjective and objective theories of prudential value obscures the way in which elements of both are needed for a comprehensive theory of prudential value. I suggest that we characterize these two types of theory in terms of their different aims: procedural (or subjective) theories give an account of the necessary conditions for something to count as good for a person, while substantive (or objective) theories give an account of what is good for a pe…Read more
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25Justifying Reasons for Valuing: An Argument Against the Social AccountSouthern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1): 141-158. 1999.
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17Deliberation About the Good: Justifying What We ValueRoutledge. 1999.This work advances a theory of deliberation about the goals, projects and values that constitute a good or worthwhile life for a person. The central argument begins with the assumption that the concerns most people have in this kind of deliberation are to discover which goals are worth pursuing, or which ends worth valuing, given those features of ourselves that we find important on reflection, and choose our goals and values in such a way that our choices can bear our reflective scrutiny.
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306Well-being: Psychological research for philosophersPhilosophy Compass 1 (5). 2006.Well-being in the broadest sense is what we have when we are living lives that are not necessarily morally good, but good for us. In philosophy, well-being has been an important topic of inquiry for millennia. In psychology, well-being as a topic has been gathering steam very recently and this research is now at a stage that warrants the attention of philosophers. The most popular theories of well-being in the two fields are similar enough to suggest the possibility of interdisciplinary collabor…Read more
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155Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4): 712--733. 2015.ABSTRACT:This paper examines the norms that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. In particular, we take up the question of which conception of well-being should govern well-being policy, assuming some such policies to be legitimate. In answer, we lay out a case for ‘pragmatic subjectivism’: given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather, it should pro…Read more
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72The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our LimitsOxford University Press. 2008.How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? Should you try to be a better friend? Should you be self-critical or self-accepting? And how should you decide among the possibilities open to you? Should you consult experts, listen to your parents, or should you do lots of research? Should you make lists of pros and cons, or go with your gut? These ar…Read more
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38Normative theory and psychological research: Hedonism, eudaimonism and why it mattersJournal of Positive Psychology 5 (3). 2010.This paper is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, King, and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive Psychology. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn to objective theories. A better understanding of the rationale for objective theories helps us to see what is needed from a theory of well-being. We then argue that a su…Read more
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1058How Theories of Well-Being Can Help Us HelpJournal of Practical Ethics 2 (2): 1-19. 2014.Some theories of well-being in philosophy and in psychology define people’s well-being in psychological terms. According to these theories, living well is getting what you want, feeling satisfied, experiencing pleasure, or the like. Other theories take well-being to be something that is not defined by our psychology: for example, they define well-being in terms of objective values or the perfection of our human nature. These two approaches present us with a trade-off: The more we define we…Read more
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429Constructivism and wise judgmentIn James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 195. 2012.In this paper I introduce a version of constructivism that relies on a theory of practical wisdom. Wise judgment constructivism is a type of constructivism because it takes correct judgments about what we have “all-in” reason to do to be the result of a process we can follow, where our interest in the results of this process stems from our practical concerns. To fully defend the theory would require a comprehensive account of wisdom, which is not available. Instead, I describe a constructivist …Read more
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39Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Christine Swanton) (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2): 494-497. 2006.Christine Swanton’s Virtue Ethics is a welcome addition to the newly flourishing field of virtue ethics. Swanton defends a rich and multifaceted virtue ethical theory that differs in interesting ways from the current paradigm, Aristotelian virtue ethics. The richness of her theory is, in part, dictated by her methodology: wide reflective equilibrium. Taking this methodology seriously, she draws on a wide range of scholarship not just in philosophy but also in psychiatry, psychology, sociology, a…Read more
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69Beyond the Experience Machine: how to build a theory of well-beingIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 398. 2013.
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27Justifying Reasons for Valuing: An Argument Against the Social AccountSouthern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1): 141-158. 1999.
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87Full information and ideal deliberationJournal of Value Inquiry 31 (3): 329-338. 1997.When we are confronted with choices we take to be important, choices that affect our more important ends or goals, we usually attempt to judge what would be best for us. We reflect on what is best for us when we have to decide such things as which college to attend, whether to go to graduate school or law school, whether to marry, or whether to take our parents in when they need care. When we make such decisions, we think about what will contribute to the best life for us. In thinking about the …Read more
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90Wisdom revisited: a case study in normative theorizingPhilosophical Explorations 14 (3): 277-295. 2011.Extensive discussions of practical wisdom are relatively rare in the philosophical literature these days. This is strange given the theoretical and practical importance of wisdom and, indeed, the etymology of the word "philosophy." In this paper, we remedy this inattention by proposing a methodology for developing a theory of wisdom and using this methodology to outline a viable theory. The methodology we favor is a version of wide reflective equilibrium. We begin with psychological research on …Read more
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1282Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in PhilosophyHypatia 27 (4): 949-957. 2012.The lack of gender parity in philosophy has garnered serious attention recently. Previous empirical work that aims to quantify what has come to be called “the gender gap” in philosophy focuses mainly on the absence of women in philosophy faculty and graduate programs. Our study looks at gender representation in philosophy among undergraduate students, undergraduate majors, graduate students, and faculty. Our findings are consistent with what other studies have found about women faculty in philos…Read more
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2The reflective life: Wisdom and happiness for real peopleIn Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Philosophy and Happiness, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 215--32. 2009.
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24Cultural differences and philosophical accounts of well-beingJournal of Happiness Studies 5 293-314. 2004.In cross-cultural studies of well-being psychologists have shown ways in which well-being or its constituents are tailored by culture (Arrindell et. al. 1997, Diener and Diener 1995, Kitayama et. al. 2000, Oishi & Diener 2001, Oishi et. al. 1999). Some psychologists have taken the fact of cultural variance to imply that there is no universal notion of well-being (Ryan and Deci, 2001, Christopher 1999). Most philosophers, on the other hand, have assumed that there is a notion of well-being that h…Read more
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40Well-being, Wisdom and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of Labor between Moral Philosophy and Positive PsychologyIn Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts, Oxford University Press. pp. 217. 2013.