•  138
    Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing
    Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 53-70. 2016.
    William Alston claimed that epistemic considerations are relevant to theorizing about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. There must be something about the intrinsic nature of a perceptual experience that explains why it is that it justifies one in believing what it does, rather than other propositions. A metaphysical theory of experience that provides the resources for such an explanation is to be preferred over ones that do not. Alston argued that the theory of appearing gains a leg up o…Read more
  •  172
    Scott Soames: Understanding truth (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2). 2002.
    Consider Soames’ Version 1 of the liar paradox.
  •  182
    Discussion. Reply to Kovach
    Mind 106 (423): 581-586. 1997.
  •  290
    Knowledge in an uncertain world
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
  •  431
    On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3): 558-589. 2007.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by gi…Read more
  •  242
    Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work
    Philosophical Studies 142 (1): 55-66. 2009.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chanc…Read more
  •  183
    Temporal parts
    Philosophy Compass 2 (5). 2007.
    This article discusses recent work in metaphysics on temporal parts. After a short introduction introducing the notion of a temporal part, we examine several well‐known arguments for the view that ordinary material objects such as tables, trees, and persons have temporal parts: (1) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve puzzles of coincidence (e.g., the statue/lump puzzle); (2) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve the problem of intrinsic change over time; and (3) the e…Read more
  •  473
    Memory and epistemic conservatism
    Synthese 157 (1): 1-24. 2007.
    Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim,…Read more
  •  158
    Deflationism and the normativity of truth
    Philosophical Studies 112 (1). 2003.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
  •  183
    What the deflationist may say about truthmaking
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3). 2003.
    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions
  •  163
    Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Epistemology has long mesmerized its practitioners with numerous puzzles. What can we know, and how can we know it? In Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, Alvin Goldman, one of the most noted contemporary epistemologists, and Matthew McGrath, known for his work on a wide range of topics in the field, have joined forces to delve into these puzzles.
  •  140
    Propositions
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  189
    Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 693-702. 2012.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
  •  105
    Truth without objectivity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 491-494. 2005.
  • Matthew McGrath
    Philosophy 74 587-610. 1998.
  •  144
    Defeating pragmatic encroachment?
    Synthese 195 (7). 2018.
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways to allow kno…Read more
  •  95
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence
  •  484
    Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.
    This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
  •  138
    Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
    Philosophical Studies 173 (4): 897-905. 2016.
    According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental…Read more