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321Siegel and the impact for epistemological internalismPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 723-732. 2013.
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199Contextualism and Subject‐SensitivityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 693-702. 2012.Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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104Review of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8). 2004.
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162Defeating pragmatic encroachment?Synthese 195 (7). 2018.This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways to allow kno…Read more
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96Between Deflationism and Correspondence TheoryRoutledge. 2000.McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence
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490Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
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1011Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis CounterexamplesIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. 2013.
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150Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experiencePhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 897-905. 2016.According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental…Read more
Brown University
PhD
St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Meta-Ethics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Epistemology |