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146
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297Knowledge in an uncertain worldOxford University Press. 2009.Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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517Memory and epistemic conservatismSynthese 157 (1): 1-24. 2007.Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim,…Read more
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166Deflationism and the normativity of truthPhilosophical Studies 112 (1). 2003.This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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196What the deflationist may say about truthmakingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3). 2003.The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions
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176Epistemology: A Contemporary IntroductionOxford University Press. 2014.Epistemology has long mesmerized its practitioners with numerous puzzles. What can we know, and how can we know it? In Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, Alvin Goldman, one of the most noted contemporary epistemologists, and Matthew McGrath, known for his work on a wide range of topics in the field, have joined forces to delve into these puzzles.
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321Siegel and the impact for epistemological internalismPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 723-732. 2013.
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199Contextualism and Subject‐SensitivityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 693-702. 2012.Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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104Review of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8). 2004.
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162Defeating pragmatic encroachment?Synthese 195 (7). 2018.This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways to allow kno…Read more
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96Between Deflationism and Correspondence TheoryRoutledge. 2000.McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence
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490Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
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1007Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis CounterexamplesIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. 2013.
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150Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experiencePhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 897-905. 2016.According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental…Read more
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725Knowing what things look likePhilosophical Review 126 (1): 1-41. 2017.Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it’s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one’s knowledge of what the relevant kind of thing looks like.…Read more
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304Conciliatory metaontology and the vindication of common senseNoûs 42 (3): 482-508. 2008.This paper is a critical response to Eli Hirsch’s recent work in metaontology. Hirsch argues that several prominent ontological disputes about physical objects are verbal, a conclusion he takes to vindicate common sense ontology. In my response, I focus on the debate over composition (van Inwagen’s special composition question). I argue that given Hirsch’s own criterion for a dispute’s being verbal – a dispute is verbal iff charity requires each side to interpret the other sides as speaking t…Read more
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191No objects, no problem?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4). 2005.One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited survive the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set …Read more
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276Dogmatism, Underminers and SkepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 533-562. 2012.
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1Between Deflationism and the Correspondence TheoryDissertation, Brown University. 1998.I offer an account of truth that combines elements of deflationism and traditional correspondence theories. We need such an intermediary account, I argue, in order to adequately answer two kinds of questions: "Why do we find it obvious that 'p' is true iff p?" and "Why is it contingent that 'p' is true iff p?" If what it is for 'p' to be true is explained by simply saying that p, as the deflationist claims, it is hard to see how it could be contingent that 'p' is true iff p. But if it is claimed…Read more
Brown University
PhD
St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Meta-Ethics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Epistemology |