profile picture

Paul Weirich

University of Missouri, Columbia
 More details
University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1977
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Probability
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
  •  45
    The Cement of Society
    Philosophical Books 33 (1): 1-9. 1992.
    This critical notice describes and evaluates Jon Elster' views in Solomonic Judgments, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, and The Cement of Society
  •  134
    Decision instability
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4). 1985.
    In some decision problems adoption of an option furnishes evidence about the option's consequences. Rational decisions take account of that evidence, although it makes an option's adoption changes the option's expected utility.
    Causal Decision TheoryDecision
  •  49
    Rousseau on Equality
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (2). 1992.
    History of Western Philosophy17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • Comte et Mill sur l'économie politique
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 52 (203): 79-93. 1998.
    This essay compares the views of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill on political economy.
    19th Century French PhilosophyJohn Stuart Mill
  •  8
    Preference
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
    Decision theory relies on an account of preference. Some accounts are behaviorist and others are mentalistic. The account used affects the explanatory power of decision theory.
    Theory in EconomicsPreferences in Decision Theory
  •  54
    Value in Ethics and Economics (review)
    Philosophical Books 36 (2): 139-141. 1995.
    This review describes and evaluates a book by Elizabeth Anderson.
    Economics and Ethics, Misc
  •  56
    [Book review] equilibrium and rationality, game theory revised by decision rules (review)
    Ethics 109 (3): 684-686. 1998.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for ident…Read more
    Game Theory
  •  34
    Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (review)
    Philosophical Books 41 (3): 217-219. 2002.
    Books reviewed: Joyce, J.M. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.
    Causal Decision Theory
  •  86
    Auguste Comte: Trajectoires positivistes 1798–1998 (review)
    Isis 96 470-471. 2005.
    Auguste Comte's version of positivism shares logical positivism's aversion to metaphysics.
    Auguste ComtePositivism, Misc
  • Frederic Schick, Ambiguity and Logic (review)
    Philosophy in Review 24 222-224. 2004.
    Theory in Economics
  •  72
    The Standard of Living
    Philosophical Books 29 (3): 180-183. 1988.
    This book review evaluate Amartya Sen's views about capabilities and the standard of living.
  •  2
    Models of Decision-Making: Simplifying Choices
    Cambridge University Press. 2014.
    The options in a decision problem generally have outcomes with common features. Putting aside the common features simplifies deliberations, but the simplification requires a philosophical justification that this book provides.
    Decision
  •  72
    Decision When Desires Are Uncertain
    Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 3 69-75. 1981.
    An agent in a decision problem may not know the goals that should guide selection of an option. Accommodating this ignorance require methods that supplement expected utility theory.
    Decision TheoryDecision
  •  47
    Self-Supporting Strategies and Equilibria in Games
    American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4). 1999.
    A strategic equilibrium is a profile of strategies that are each self-supporting given the profile. Strategic equilibria exist in games without Nash equilibria.
    Game Theory