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33The contributorsSynthese 176 (1): 149-150. 2010.This lists the contributors to a special issue on realistic standards for decisions.
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15Review of John Kagel, Raymond Battalio, and Leonard Green, ECONOMIC CHOICE THEORY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (review)Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 295-302. 1999.Economic theory may explain the behavior of animals. Its application to animals is not straightforward, however.
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34Decisions without Sharp ProbabilitiesPhilosophia Scientiae 19 213-225. 2015.Adam Elga [Elga 2010] argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions
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22Auguste Comte: Trajectoires positivistes 1798–1998 (review)Isis 96 470-471. 2005.Auguste Comte's version of positivism shares logical positivism's aversion to metaphysics.
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300Conditional utility and its place in decision theoryJournal of Philosophy 77 (11): 702-715. 1980.Causal decision theory attends to probabilities used to obtain an option's expected utility but for completeness should also attend to utilities of possible outcomes. A suitable formula for an option's expected utility uses a certain type of conditional utility.
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6Probabilities in decision rulesIn Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science, Springer. pp. 289--319. 2010.The theory of direct reference suggests revising probability theory so that a probability attaches to a proposition given a way of understanding the proposition. The revisions make probabilities relative but do not change their structure.
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1Models of Decision-Making: Simplifying ChoicesCambridge University Press. 2014.The options in a decision problem generally have outcomes with common features. Putting aside the common features simplifies deliberations, but the simplification requires a philosophical justification that this book provides.
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52Labeling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal Debate (edited book)Oup Usa. 2007.Food products with genetically modified ingredients are common, yet many consumers are unaware of this. When polled, consumers say that they want to know whether their food contains GM ingredients, just as many want to know whether their food is natural or organic. Informing consumers is a major motivation for labeling. But labeling need not be mandatory. Consumers who want GM-free products will pay a premium to support voluntary labeling. Why do consumers want to know about GM ingredients? GM f…Read more
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Comte et Mill sur l'économie politiqueRevue Internationale de Philosophie 52 (203): 79-93. 1998.This essay compares the views of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill on political economy.
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94Initiating coordinationPhilosophy of Science 74 (5): 790-801. 2007.How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. ‡I thank the audience at my paper's presentation at the 2006 PSA meeting for many insightful points. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department,…Read more
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37Contractiarianism and Bargaining TheoryJournal of Philosophical Research 16 369-385. 1991.Classical bargaining theory attempts to solve a bargaining problem using only the information about the problem contained in the representation of its possible outcomes in utility space. However, this information usually underdetermines the solution. I use additional information about interpersonal comparisons of utility and bargaining power. The solution is then the outcome that maximizes the sum of power-weighted utilities. I use these results to advance a contractarian argument for a utilitar…Read more
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84Economic RationalityIn Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oup Usa. 2004.Weirich examines three competing views entertained by economic theory about the instrumental rationality of decisions: the first says to maximize self-interest, the second to maximize utility, and the third to satisfice, that is, to adopt a satisfactory option. Critics argue that the first view is too narrow, that the second overlooks the benefits of teamwork and planning, and that the third, when carefully formulated, reduces to the second. Weirich defends a refined version of the principle to …Read more
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14Self-Supporting Strategies and Equilibria in GamesAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4). 1999.A strategic equilibrium is a profile of strategies that are each self-supporting given the profile. Strategic equilibria exist in games without Nash equilibria.
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21Annie Petit . Auguste Comte: Trajectoires positivistes 1798–1998. 438 pp., bibl., index. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003 (review)Isis 96 (3): 470-471. 2005.
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7Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility AnalysisCambridge University Press. 2001.In Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis, first published in 2001, Paul Weirich increases the power and versatility of utility analysis and in the process advances decision theory. Combining traditional and novel methods of option evaluation into one systematic method of analysis, multidimensional utility analysis is a valuable tool. It provides formulations of important decision principles, such as the principle to maximize expected utility; enriches decision theory in solving recal…Read more
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Richard Jeffrey, Probability and the Art of Judgment Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 12 (5): 333-335. 1992.
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120Unsharp SharpnessTheoria 80 (1): 100-103. 2013.In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's, Gärdenfors and Sahlin's, and Kyburg's, though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection
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320Conditional probabilities and probabilities given knowledge of a conditionPhilosophy of Science 50 (1): 82-95. 1983.The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the proba…Read more
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Review: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (review)Philosophical Books 41 (3): 217-219. 2000.
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90The St. Petersburg gamble and riskTheory and Decision 17 (2): 193-202. 1984.One resolution of the St. Petersburg paradox recognizes that a gamble carries a risk sensitive to the gamble's stakes. If aversion to risk increases sufficiently fast as stakes go up, the St. Petersburg gamble has a finite utility.
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14The Cement of SocietyPhilosophical Books 33 (1): 1-9. 1992.This critical notice describes and evaluates Jon Elster' views in Solomonic Judgments, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, and The Cement of Society
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24Decisions without Sharp ProbabilitiesPhilosophia Scientiae 19 213-225. 2015.Adam Elga [Elga 2010] argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions.
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |
General Philosophy of Science |