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31Analyticity, Apriority, ModalityIn Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Continuum International. pp. 228. 2012.
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612Intuition, Thought Experiments, and the A PrioriIn Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification, Oup Usa. pp. 233-250. 2014.My purpose in this paper is to examine the role of intuition in conceptual analysis and to assess whether that role can be parlayed into a plausible defense of a priori knowledge. The focus of my investigation is George Bealer’s attempt to provide such a defense. I argue that Bealer’s account of intuition and its evidential status faces three problems. I go on to examine the two primary arguments that Bealer offers against empiricism: the Starting Points Argument and the Argument from Epistemic …Read more
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37Experience and A Priori JustificationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 665-671. 2001.Laurence BonJour’s In Defense of Pure Reason is rich and challenging. It offers a tightly integrated attack on empiricism and defense of rationalism. The tight texture of argument makes it difficult to isolate and assess specific aspects of the book in a brief discussion. My goal is to examine the role of experience in BonJour’s conception of a priori justification.
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246The definition of a priori knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2): 220-224. 1977.
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115Revisability, reliabilism, and a priori knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2): 187-213. 1988.
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3Conceivability and possibilityRatio (Misc.) 17 (1): 118-121. 1975.The purpose of this article is to defend Hume's claim that whatever is conceivable is possible from a criticism by William Kneale. Kneale argues that although a mathematician can conceive of the falsehood of the Goldbach conjecture, he does not conclude that it is not necessarily true. The author suggests that by taking into account Hume's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, a revised version of his claim can be offered which is not open to Kneale's criticism.
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831Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori DistinctionIn Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification, Oup Usa. pp. 289-327. 2014.The distinction between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge has come under attack in the recent literature by Philip Kitcher, John Hawthorne, C. S. Jenkins, and Timothy Williamson. Evaluating the attacks requires answering two questions. First, have they hit their target? Second, are they compelling? My goal is to argue that the attacks fail because they miss their target. Since the attacks are directed at a particular concept or distinction, they must accurately locate the target conc…Read more
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277Annotated Bibliography on A Priori KnowledgeIn Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification, Oup Usa. pp. 329-339. 2014.A selective annotated bibliography of recent literature on a priori knowledge.
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95Grounding Concepts, by C. S. Jenkins.: Book Reviews (review)Mind 119 (475): 805-810. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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250What is entitlement?Acta Analytica 22 (4). 2007.In his seminal paper, Content Preservation, Tyler Burge defends an original account of testimonial knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of that framework is the introduction of the concept of entitlement, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. Entitlement and justification, according to Burge, are sub-species of warrant. Justification is the inter…Read more
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104The a Priori in Philosophy (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2013.For much of the past two millennia philosophers have embraced a priori knowledge and have thought that the a priori plays an important role in philosophy itself. Philosophers from Plato to Descartes, Kant to Kripke, all endorse the a priori and engage in a priori reasoning in their philosophical discussions. Recent work in epistemology and experimental philosophy, however, has raised questions about both the existence of a priori knowledge and the centrality of the a priori for philosophy. This …Read more
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99Defeasible a priori justification: A reply to ThurowPhilosophical Quarterly 58 (231). 2008.Joshua Thurow offers a defence of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which I make against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. I show that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal.
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146Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of ConceivabilityAnalysis 39 (4): 212--219. 1979.Hume's maxim consists of two principles which are logically independent of each other: (1) whatever is conceivable is possible; and (2) whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Thomas Reid offered several arguments against the former principle, while John Stuart mill argued against the latter. The primary concern of this paper is to examine whether Reid and mill were successful in calling Hume's maxim into question.
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315Knowledge, A PrioriIn D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. pp. 79-86. 2006.
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201Analyzing a priori knowledgePhilosophical Studies 142 (1). 2009.There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge. There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some g…Read more
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252Knowledge and modalitySynthese 172 (3). 2010.Kripke claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. These claims challenge the traditional Kantian view that (K) All knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths. Kripke’s claims continue to be resisted, which indicates that the Kantian view remains attractive. My goal is to identify the most plausible principles linking the epistemic and the modal. My strategy for identifying the principles is to investigate …Read more
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110Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori JustificationPhilosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 41-58. 2005.Radical empiricism is the view that experience is the only source of knowledge. Hence, radical empiricism denies the existence of a priori knowledge. Its most famous proponents are John Stuart Mill and W. V. Quine. Although both reject a priori knowledge, they offer different empiricist accounts of the knowledge alleged by their opponents to be a priori. My primary concern in this paper is not with the cogency of their positive accounts. My focus is their arguments against a priori knowledge. My…Read more
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158The spatial structure of perceptual spacePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4): 665-671. 1986.
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48Reply to my Critics: Anthony Brueckner and Robin JeshionIn Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori?, Open Court. pp. 111. 2011.
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61Conjunctive properties revisitedAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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64Phenomenal propertiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (2): 165-169. 1982.This Article does not have an abstract
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22In Defense of Pure ReasonPhilosophical Review 109 (1): 103. 2000.This book is an important contribution to the contemporary epistemological literature. It is the only available book-length treatment of epistemological issues associated with the a priori. Moreover, it provides the most comprehensive articulation and defense of traditional rationalism. The book is tightly organized, crisply argued, and sets the standard against which competing accounts must be measured.
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109The contingent identity of particulars and universalsMind 93 (372): 527-541. 1984.The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that particulars in the actual world are nothing but complexes of universals. I begin by briefly presenting bertrand russell's version of this view and exposing its primary difficulty. I then examine the key assumption which leads russell to difficulty and show that it is mistaken. The rejection of this assumption forms the basis of an alternative version of the view which is articulated and defended.
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77Adverbial theories of sensing and the many-property problemPhilosophical Studies 44 (September): 143-160. 1983.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |