•  99
    Defeasible a priori justification: A reply to Thurow
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231). 2008.
    Joshua Thurow offers a defence of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which I make against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. I show that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal.
  •  104
    The a Priori in Philosophy (edited book)
    with Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow
    Oxford University Press UK. 2013.
    For much of the past two millennia philosophers have embraced a priori knowledge and have thought that the a priori plays an important role in philosophy itself. Philosophers from Plato to Descartes, Kant to Kripke, all endorse the a priori and engage in a priori reasoning in their philosophical discussions. Recent work in epistemology and experimental philosophy, however, has raised questions about both the existence of a priori knowledge and the centrality of the a priori for philosophy. This …Read more
  •  312
    Knowledge, A Priori
    In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. pp. 79-86. 2006.
  •  145
    Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability
    Analysis 39 (4): 212--219. 1979.
    Hume's maxim consists of two principles which are logically independent of each other: (1) whatever is conceivable is possible; and (2) whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Thomas Reid offered several arguments against the former principle, while John Stuart mill argued against the latter. The primary concern of this paper is to examine whether Reid and mill were successful in calling Hume's maxim into question.