Albert Casullo

David Henderson and Terry Horgan offer a detailed account of the structure of conceptual analysis that is embedded within a more general account of a priori justification. Their account highlights an important feature of conceptual analysis that has been overlooked in the recent debate. Although it is generally recognized that conceptual analysis involves an inference from premises to the effect that some concept does (or does not) apply to a range of particular cases to a general conclusion about the nature of the concept itself, the details of that inference have not been fully articulated. Henderson and Horgan offer an articulation of the inferential connection which, taken in conjunction with their account of a priori justification, yields a startling conclusion about the epistemic status of the results of conceptual analysis. My view is that their account of a priori justification misses the mark and, as a consequence, they arrive at a conclusion about the epistemic status of the results of conceptual analysis that many will find implausible. Moreover, I fear that because many will find their overall conclusion implausible, they will either overlook or dismiss the important feature of the inferential connection that Henderson and Horgan correctly highlight. Hence, I have two goals. First, I want to track down the source of their mischaracterization of the a priori and to show why it is a mischaracterization. Second, I want to highlight the important feature of the inferential connection involved in conceptual analysis that they identify, articulate its bearing on the debate over the existence of a priori knowledge and assess its implications.

Edward Erwin has recently argued against the thesis that the concepts a priori truth’ and ‘necessary truth’ are extensionally equivalent. This thesis consists of two logically independent claims: all a priori truths are necessary; and all necessary truths are a priori. Erwin leaves the first claim unchallenged and elects to devote his efforts exclusively to undermining the second. The brunt of his attack on the second claim rests on alleged unclarities in the concept of an a priori truth. He attempts to show that the E.E.H. cannot be defended upon any plausible interpretation of this concept. Although I agree that the E.E.H., as stated above, is open to Erwin's objections, I shall argue that a slightly revised version of it can be defended against these objections.

Kripke claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. These claims challenge the traditional Kantian view that (K) All knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths. Kripke’s claims continue to be resisted, which indicates that the Kantian view remains attractive. My goal is to identify the most plausible principles linking the epistemic and the modal. My strategy for identifying the principles is to investigate two related questions. Are there compelling general supporting arguments for (K)? Are there decisive counterexamples to (K)? My investigation uncovers two intuitively plausible principles that are not open to decisive counterexamples but which enjoy no compelling independent support.

Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory on the scope of a priori knowledge.