Jennifer McKitrick

Dispositional Pluralism is more consistent with our dispositions talk than more monolithic views. Our evidence for extrinsic, ungrounded, and non-natural dispositions is comparable to that of intrinsic, grounded, and natural ones. Dispositional Pluralism has wide applicability to various philosophical issues. Secondary qualities, such as colors, can be given a dispositional account. Thinking of character traits as dispositions sheds light on the debate over Dispositionalism Situationism in moral psychology. One can give an account of gender identity as a cluster of behavioral dispositions. Finally, the potentiality of an embryo or a patient is best understood as an extrinsic dispositional property.

Nick Kroll’s Teleological Approach to Dispositions (TAD) promises to explain the sense in which dispositions are directed at manifesting. However, Kroll’s explanation of directedness is problematic for a number of reasons. First, TAD depends on a distinction between a disposition being stimulated and it being “activated,” but Kroll’s obscure notion of activation seems incapable of solving the problems for which it was introduced. Second, TAD does not attribute directedness to the disposition itself, but to a distinct state of the disposed object. Third, TAD either implies the implausible view that a disposed object is in a state directed at having its disposition stimulated, or it does not account for a disposition’s directedness when it is not in stimulating circumstances. Finally, if TAD does give us directedness, it is liable to give too much, for it is likely to entail that everything is constantly directed in innumerably many different directions.

Jennifer McKitrick examines the causes moving many philosophers to pull Aristotelian powers out of history’s dustbin, the failure to reduce or eliminate dispositional ascriptions from philosophical and scientific discourses. Although many see this failure as grounds for rejecting Humeanism and return to Aristotelianism, McKitrick argues that only a more moderate reaction is warranted. She argues that restricting analysis to fundamental dispositions and adding a condition requiring the power ascription be grounded in or made true by the fact that the object possesses that fundamental disposition is the better reaction. McKitrick canvasses the main twentieth-century attempts to reduce or eliminate dispositional talk. She begins with the logical positivists’ attempt to replace dispositional talk with material conditionals. Then, after briefly considering Ryle’s version, she turns to Goodman and the move to replace material conditional analyses with stronger-than-material conditionals, such as causal implication or counterfactual conditionals backed up by natural kinds and laws of nature. Next, she turns to Lewis’s possible worlds semantics and concludes with a presentation of the ‘Simple Counterfactual Analysis’. Despite these problems with providing analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of counterfactuals, McKitrick recognizes that there is still an important connection between dispositions and counterfactuals. A thing’s disposition is its property of having a certain kind of counterfactual hold of it. But she advocates restricting counterfactual analyses to fundamental dispositions and powers and requiring that they be made true, or grounded by, the fact that the object has that power.

The laws of nature are at most physically necessary, and they are not metaphysically necessary. Dispositional Essentialists claim that if natural laws derive from powers, then the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. But the idea that properties have dispositional essences does not entail necessitarianism for several reasons. There might be no laws of nature. The laws might have exceptions, or be probabilistic. There are non-dispositional properties that could figure in contingent laws. The world might have contained different properties. Finally, even if a property has a dispositional essence, it might have had a slightly different causal profile. Furthermore, the Necessitarian’s views are less revisionary than they initially seem.

Some dispositions are causally relevant to or causally efficacious for their manifestations. But according to the Inert Dispositions Thesis, dispositions are causally inert. Some philosophers claim that grounded dispositions are causally impotent. According to Analyticity Arguments, the analytic connection between a disposition term and a manifestation term indicates that there is no causal connection between their referents. According to Independence Arguments, cause and effect must be independent in a way that dispositions and manifestation are not. According to Exclusion Arguments, a disposition’s causal basis causally explains its manifestation, leaving no causal work for the disposition to do. These arguments for the Inert Dispositions Thesis do not succeed. Higher-level, grounded dispositions can be causally efficacious with respect to their manifestations.

A causally efficacious or relevant property is a property of a cause. However, not every property of a cause is causally relevant to its effect. Further conditions are needed to screen off causally irrelevant properties. Proposals for further conditions include: The causally relevant property must have explanatory power; there must be counterfactual dependence of the effect on the causally relevant property; there must be a lawful connection between the causally relevant property and its effect; the complete set of causally relevant properties must exclude any other properties from playing a causal role; the causally relevant property must be independent from its effect, in some sense; and finally, the causally relevant property is a member of a set of properties that is minimally sufficient for the effect. The most plausible accounts count dispositions as causally relevant.

Some dispositions have causal bases or grounding properties. However, ungrounded dispositions do not have causal bases. Ungrounded dispositions are also known as powers, baseless dispositions, and bare dispositions. Ungrounded dispositions are not supplanted by mechanistic explanations, for even mechanistic explanations ultimately reference dispositions. While some argue that citing dispositions does not really explain anything, dispositions can in fact figure in adequate explanations. Furthermore, scientific explanations reference dispositions with no known grounds. This lends some support for the view that ungrounded dispositions are metaphysically possible. Philosophical arguments based on multiple realizability or the demand for truth-makers fail to show that ungrounded dispositions are impossible.

Some dispositions are intrinsic properties while others are extrinsic properties. Many extrinsic properties bear the Marks of Dispositionality. Perfect intrinsic duplicates could differ with respect to certain dispositions. A thing could lose a disposition merely by changing its location. Examples of extrinsic dispositions include visibility, vulnerability, and recognizability. Some philosophers argue that extrinsic dispositions are unnatural or derivative, and that this is some reason to think that extrinsic dispositions do not really exist. However, all but the most fundamental properties are derivative. Unless one is committed to a sparse theory of properties, a property’s being non-fundamental is no reason to think that it does not exist. Furthermore, it is not obvious that all extrinsic dispositions must be derivative. It is possible, and perhaps scientifically plausible, to think that some fundamental powers such as mass, are extrinsic.

A disposition’s trigger is its circumstances of manifestation or stimulus condition. Examples of triggers include striking, stretching, and submerging in water. Some argue that no dispositions have triggers. However, such a view leaves it unclear how dispositions can be testable or action guiding. Furthermore, triggers are events, and events involve an object acquiring a property. This leads to a regress problem for pandispositionalism, the view that all properties are dispositions. Some dispositions need a stimulus in order to manifest, and some do not. Dispositions that manifest spontaneously and those that are constantly manifesting do not have triggers. However, some dispositions have a latent or dormant state, and only manifest in certain circumstances.

Manifestations are events which are effects of dispositions being activated. Events often involve something acquiring a property. According to dispositional monism or pandispositionalism, all properties are dispositions. If all properties were dispositions, then all manifestations would involve something acquiring a disposition. Whether this leads to a vicious regress is unclear. However, pandispositionalism may render nearly all properties unobservable. Another issue about manifestations involves the question of whether dispositions are all single-track or whether some of them are multi-track. Some philosophers argue that each type of disposition has one type of manifestation. However, the events that occur when a disposition manifests vary according to the circumstances. This motivates some philosophers to say that manifestations are not effects but are instead contributions to effects. But it is not clear what kind of entity a contribution is, or if it is needed. Consequently, dispositions are extremely numerous or massively multi-track.

On an abundant conception of properties, properties serve as semantic values for most predicates and property names. Abundance is central to Dispositional Pluralism. Dispositional Pluralism is compatible with different theories of the metaphysics of properties. According to universalism (realism) properties are universals that are wholly present wherever they are instantiated. According to extensionalism (class nominalism) properties are sets of objects. According to trope theory, properties are sets of particular property instances, or tropes. In any case, properties _correspond_ to sets of objects. Abundance is preferable to sparsity—the view that only an elite minority of sets of particulars correspond to properties. On most sparse views, the “real” properties are largely unknown. Consequently, sparse properties are unfit for the roles properties are posited to play: They rarely serve as the semantic values of predicates; they do not explain familiar causal powers; and it is not clear how they explain apparent similarities.

Properties correspond to sets of objects. Facts are mind-independent entities that are constituted by objects and properties and are occasionally expressed by true claims. Counterfactual facts are occasionally expressed by true counterfactual claims, and like other facts, they have properties and objects as constituents. A disposition is a property that corresponds to a set of objects which are constituents of certain kinds of counterfactual facts; in other words, a disposition corresponds to a set of objects of which a certain kind of counterfactual holds. To attribute a dispositional predicate to something is to roughly indicate the kind of counterfactuals that one believes to hold of it. Counterfactuals hold of things for a variety of reasons, one of those reasons being because the thing has a power, where a power is a kind of disposition.

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.

To say that something has a certain disposition is to indicate what it might do in certain circumstances. One can tell if a property, concept, or predicate is dispositional if it bears the Marks of Dispositionality. These marks include manifestations, triggers, the possibility of possession without manifestation, as well as connections with counterfactuals and overtly dispositional locutions. Dispositions can be distinguished from non-dispositional properties. The broad range of dispositional concepts employed in ordinary language, science, and philosophy shows that they are abundant and diverse. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s chapters.

Four metaphysicians, Charlie Martin, David Lewis, David Armstrong, and George Molnar, offer distinctive approaches to understanding powers. Martin challenges the widely held view that disposition statements can be eliminated in favor of conditional statements. The apparent failure of the conditional analysis clears the path for Martin’s idea that all properties have some degree of irreducible dispositionality. Lewis takes on Martin’s challenge and offers his reformed conditional analysis. This analysis does not purport to eliminate talk of dispositions, but instead metaphysically reduces dispositions to their causal bases. Armstrong also reduces dispositions, but he reduces them to categorical universals governed by natural laws. Molnar argues that each of the aforementioned views falters when confronted with the powers of fundamental particles, which are said to be ungrounded pure powers. Molnar holds that both fundamental and derivative powers exist alongside non-power spatial and temporal properties. Debates among these four philosophers in the latter half of the 20th century constitute a substantial part of the reemergence of discussion of powers in contemporary metaphysics.

Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions.

Gideon Yaffee’s Manifest Activity is an important contribution to both the studies of Thomas Reid’s views and action theory. Reid is known as an early advocate of an agent-causal view of free will; more recent advocates include Roderick Chisholm. Manifest Activity is a well-appreciated effort at bringing Reid’s particular version of agent-causalism and his arguments for it into the contemporary discussion. Manifest Activity should be of interest to Reid scholars, action theorists, and anyone who wants to explore a focused, critical analysis of a fascinating thinker. Yaffee’s writing is clear and readable, yet rigorous and detailed. Yaffee’s aim in each chapter is clearly laid out, and the structure of each is clear. Some chapters start out with a reconstruction of one of Reid’s argument, and then Yaffee assesses each of the premises in turn. Other chapters begin with an interpretive puzzle, which Yaffee solves with resources from the Reid corpus. At times, the dialectic gets complex, but concise summaries that tie the arguments together are a welcome end of each chapter. Skipping the footnotes is not recommended, as they often contain significant reflections, extensions, or qualifications of points in the main text, if not important references to historical and contemporary texts

To determine whether dispositions are causally relevant, we have to get clear about what causal relevance is. Several characteristics of causal relevance have been suggested, including Explanatory Power, Counterfactual Dependence, Lawfullness, Exclusion, Independence, and Minimal Sufficiency. Different accounts will yield different answers about the causal relevance of dispositions. However, accounts of causal relevance that are the most plausible, for independent reasons, render the verdict that dispositions are causally relevant.

As author Christopher Prendergast acknowledges, Counterfactuals: Paths of the Might have Been does not attempt to offer a theory of counterfactuals, nor does it develop a contribution to an existing theory. Instead, it is as the author puts it an “anthropology of the counterfactual”. However, it is nothing as systematic as that. It is not a survey, but a series of “listening exercises” which roam over literature, history, art, philosophy, music, and popular culture. He admits that this exercise of collecting counterfactuals is “quirky business” akin “wool gathering” and “purposeless daydreaming”. However, Prendergast does have some aims in Counterfactuals. He claims that he wants to show the variety of counterfactuals, how they are used, and how they resonate in human experience. If the book aims to support an overarching conclusion, it is probably this: “What we do with counterfactuals and what they do to us are integral to making sense of humanity”.

Feminist metaphysics is simultaneously feminist theorizing and metaphysics. Part of feminist metaphysics concerns social ontology and considers such questions as, What is the nature of social kinds, such as genders? Feminist metaphysicians also consider whether gendered perspectives influence metaphysical theorizing; for example, have approaches to the nature of the self or free will been conducted from a masculinist perspective, and would a feminist perspective yield different theories? Some feminist metaphysicians develop metaphysical theories with the aim of furthering certain social goals, such as gender equality. Despite these and other intriguing research projects, feminist metaphysics faces challenges from two flanks: one might argue that "feminist metaphysics" is not metaphysics, or one might argue that it is not feminist. Recently, Elizabeth Barnes has made the case that, since contemporary accounts of the nature of metaphysics focus primarily on the fundamental, they have the problematic implication that feminist metaphysics is not, properly speaking, metaphysics. However, less emphasis has been paid, of late, to the idea that major strands of feminist thought also problematize feminist metaphysics. I will briefly assess the metaphysician's case against feminist metaphysics in Section 2 of this chapter. Then, in Section 3, I will examine in more detail possible feminist concerns over metaphysics. In Section 4, I sketch a different conception of metaphysics that avoids both mainstream and feminist challenges to feminist metaphysics.

There's a student in my philosophy class who has "real potential." I might express this thought in any of the following ways: "She is potentially a philosopher"; "She is a potential philosopher"; "She has the potential to be a philosopher." The first way uses a cognate of "potential" as an adverb to modify "is." The second ways uses "potential" as an adjective to modify "philosopher." However, the third way uses "potential" as a noun to refer to something that the student has. What kind of thing is this potential? One worry about even asking this question is that this nominalization of the adjective "potential" suggests a metaphysical picture that is an artifact of language. This is even more strongly suggested by the less ambiguous nominalization "potentiality." Once we have the term "potentiality," we have a new kind of entity to countenance, and questions about its nature arise. One might argue, just because we use the word "potentiality," we should not think that it refers to a "thing" that someone can "have." There is something disingenuous about such an argument. It proceeds as if the adverbial and adjectival uses of "potential" are unproblematic, and questions only arise with the nominalization. But it is not obvious what it means to potentially be something, or what it means to be a potential something. To say that someone "is potentially" a philosopher is to talk about a way of being that falls short of actuality. And a "potential philosopher" is not a kind of philosopher at all. So what is it? Each of the three above formulations is a modal claim. If there is anything philosophical puzzling about a potentiality claim, it is not going to go away by translating it into an equivalent modal claim. In this chapter I defend the existence of potentialities against anti-realist arguments, and make a proposal as to their nature. The proposal, in short, is that potentialities are properties, specifically dispositions, though more needs to be said about properties and dispositions. I will do this in Part I. In Part II, I will address two lines of argument against potentialities: that they are reducible, and that they are causally inert.

In “Teleological Dispositions,” Nick Kroll appeals to teleology to account for the way that dispositions seem to be directed toward their merely possible manifestations. He argues that his teleological account of dispositions does a better job of making sense of this directedness than rival approaches that appeal to conditional statements or physical intentionality. In this short critique, I argue that, without satisfactory clarification of a number of issues, TAD does not adequately account for the directedness of dispositions. I focus on two aspects of TAD: the Activation Principle, and the proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for being a dispositional property.