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73Can There be a Proof that an Unprovable Sentence of Arithmetic is True?Dialectica 43 (43): 289-292. 1989.Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
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127The Received Distinction Between Pragmatics, Syntax and SemanticsFoundations of Language 11 (1): 97-104. 1974.The distinction between pragmatics, semantics, and syntax, at least as traditionally construed, is argued to be defective in various respects.
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175A defense of SommersPhilosophical Studies 29 (5). 1976.Jon Fjeld wrote a paper that he begins by nicely outlining why various criticisms of Fred Sommers theory of types and categories fail. Fjeld puts forth a criticism that avoids the problems with these other criticisms. But, it is argued, his criticism also fails.
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Chapter 1: IntroductionPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 35-42. 2006.
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97Should persons be sacrificed for the general welfare?Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (2): 149-152. 1982.It is argued that Robert Nozick is wrong in asserting that persons should not be sacrificed for the general welfare.
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112Tractatus 6.2–6.22Philosophical Investigations 13 (2): 126-136. 1990.It is argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks 6.2-6.22 Tractatus fare well when one focuses on non-quantificational arithmetic, but they are problematic when one moves to quantificational arithmetic.
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119A fregean principleHistory and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3): 125-135. 1998.Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds
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200Prior’s Theory of TruthAnalysis 47 (2): 83-87. 1987.This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
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198Prior on Propositional IdentityAnalysis 36 (4): 182-184. 1976.Let A, B, C stand for sentences expressing propositions; let A be a component of C; let C A/B be just like C except for replacing some occurrence of A in C by an occurrence of B; let = be a binary connective for propositional identity read as ‘the proposition that __ is the very same proposition as …’. Then authors defend adding ‘from C = C A/B infer A = B’ to Prior’s rules for propositional identity, appearing in OBJECTS OF THOUGHT.
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93Redundant truthRatio 5 (1): 24-37. 1992.A strong and weak version of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. The weak version is defended against this argument. The strong version, however, is vitiated by truth-value gaps.
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83Is English infinite?Philosophical Papers 17 (2): 141-151. 1988.It is argued that English is finite. By this is meant that it contains only finitely many expressions. The conclusion is reached by arguing: (1) only finitely many expressions of English are tokenable; (2) if E is an expression of English, then E is tokenable.
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186Malcolm on criteriaBehavior and Philosophy 32 (2): 349-358. 2004.Consider the general proposition that normally when people pain-behave they are in pain. Where a traditional philosopher like Mill tries to give an empirical proof of this proposition (the argument from analogy), Malcolm tries to give a transcendental proof. Malcolm’s argument is transcendental in that he tries to show that the very conditions under which we can have a concept provide for the application of the concept and the knowledge that the concept is truly as well as properly applied. The…Read more
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1302Null SentencesIyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48 23-36. 1999.In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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71Completeness theorems for two propositional logics in which identity diverges from mutual entailmentNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3): 269-282. 1981.Anderson and Belnap devise a model theory for entailment on which propositional identity equals proposional coentailment. This feature can be reasonably questioned. The authors devise two extensions of Anderson and Belnap’s model theory. Both systems preserve Anderson and Belnap’s results for entailment, but distinguish coentailment from identity.
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University of Nebraska, LincolnRetired faculty
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America