-
188Does scientific realism entail mathematical realism?Facta Philosophica 5 (1): 173-182. 2003.Hilary Putnam suggests that the essence of the realist conception of mathematics is that the statements of mathematics are objective so that the true ones are objectively true. An argument for mathematical realism, thus conceived, is implicit in Putnam's writing. The first premise is that within currently accepted science there are objective truths. Next is the premise that some of these statements logically imply statements of pure mathematics. The conclusion drawn is that some statements of pu…Read more
-
107God and empty termsInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3). 1985.This paper is a criticism of Plantinga’s analysis of a version of the ontological argument. He thinks it is obvious that his version is valid and that the only question of interest is whether a key premise is true. The paper lays out two relevant semantical accounts of modal logic. It contends that Plantinga needs to show that one is preferable to the other.
-
131This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
-
Chapter 9: Thesis TwoPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 241-253. 2006.
-
203The Province of LogicAnalysis 36 (1): 47-48. 1975.Quine criticizes Strawson’s account of the province of logic. Robert Hadley proposes a refutation of Quine. This paper proposes a refutation of Hadley.
-
19Replies to CommentariesPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 (1): 369-386. 2006.
-
168A defense of mill on other mindsDialectica 57 (3). 2003.This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
-
Chapter 5: Existence, Number, and RealismPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 129-155. 2006.
-
765Strawson on CategoriesJournal of Critical Analysis 7 (3): 83-88. 1978.A type theory constructed with reference to a particular language will associate with each monadic predicate P of that language a class of individuals C(P) of which it is categorically significant to predicate P (or which P spans, for short). The extension of P is a subset of C(P), which is a subset of the language’s universe of discourse. The set C(P) is a category discriminated by the language. The relation 'is spanned by the same predicates as' divides the language’s universe of discourse int…Read more
-
118Quine's relativismRatio 3 (2): 142-149. 1990.A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.
-
914Are All Tautologies True?Logique Et Analyse 125 (25): 3-14. 1989.The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
-
356Propositions and eternal sentencesMind 77 (308): 537-542. 1968.Two different uses of ‘proposition’ are distinguished: the meaning of an eternal sentence is distinguished from that which can be asserted, believed, conjectured, and so on. It is argued that, in the second sense of ‘proposition’, it is not the case that every proposition can be expressed by an eternal sentence.
-
210Paradox and Semantical CorrectnessAnalysis 39 (4): 166-169. 1979.In a series of papers R. L. Martin propounds a theory for dealing with the semantical paradoxes. This paper is a criticism of that theory.
-
University of Nebraska, LincolnRetired faculty
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America