Joakim Sandberg

A critical issue for the future growth of socially responsible investment (SRI) is to what extent institutional investors such as pension funds can be persuaded to engage in it. This paper considers attempts at justifying such engagement stemming from a range of (re-)interpretations of the fiduciary duties owed by pension funds to their beneficiaries, and thereby develops a hypothesis concerning the most effective political or legal remedy. Previous commentary suggests that fiduciary duty either already mandates SRI for pension funds, or at least can be made to do so rather easily. In contrast with this, however, this paper finds that none of the considered interpretations is able to justify engagement on social and environmental issues across the board. Indeed, the problem to some extent seems rooted in the very concept of fiduciary duty. The paper is relevant to current attempts at justifying SRI through reinterpretations of fiduciary duty, provided mainly by legal scholars and practitioners. By addressing the more philosophical issue of how far the concept of fiduciary duty can be “stretched” to accommodate SRI (a project of conceptual rather than legal clarification), it provides an evaluation of the contemporary debate which is independent of squabbles about existing law. The paper shows that there are conceptual limits to attempts at redefining fiduciary duty. But this does not mean that pension funds' engagement in SRI is unjustified or unjustifiable more generally. A more promising way to legally mandate SRI may be through what is dubbed independent social and environmental obligations.

As one of the more progressive facets of the socially responsibleinvestment movement, shareholder activism isgenerally recommended or justified on the grounds that itcan create social change. But how effective are differentkinds of activist campaigns likely to be in this regard? Thisarticle outlines the full range of different ways in whichshareholder activism could make a difference by carefullygoing through, first, all the more specific lines of actiontypically included under the shareholder activismumbrella and, second, all of the different ways in which ithas been suggested that these could influence the activitiesof commercial companies. It is argued that – althoughmuch more empirical research is needed in the area – thereare at least theoretical reasons for thinking that it will bedifficult to influence companies through the standardactions of filing or voting on shareholder resolutions.However, some alternative strategies open to activists mayallow them to increase their efficacy. It is specificallyargued that even individual investors could be able to pushfor corporate change through devising a radically selfsacrificialcampaign that manages to get the attention ofpowerful forces outside the corporate sphere.