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253Mill's “Proof” of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted DefenseSocial Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 330. 2001.How many serious mistakes can a brilliant philosopher make in a single paragraph? Many think that Mill answers this question by example—in the third paragraph of Chapter IV of Utilitarianism. Here is the notorious paragraph: The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to pr…Read more
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28Desires... and Beliefs... of One's OwnIn Manuel Vargas (ed.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press. pp. 129-151. 2014.On one influential view, a person acts autonomously, doing what she genuinely values, if she acts on a desire that is her own, which is (on this account) a matter of it being appropriately ratified at a higher level. This view faces two problems. It doesn’t generalize, as it should, to an account of when a belief is an agent’s own, and does not let one distinguish between desires (and beliefs) happening to be one's own and their being the ones a person would need to have in order to be autonomou…Read more
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344Being a realist about relativism (in ethics)Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2): 155-176. 1991.How should a moral realist respond to the (seemingly) abundant evidence diversity provides for relativism? Many think there is only one reasonable response: abandon moral realism. Against them, I argue that moral realists can stand their ground in the face of moral diversity without relying on excessively optimistic arguments or unrealistic assumptions. In the process, I defend two theses: (i) that, far from being incompatible with moral realism, many plausible versions of relativism are _versio…Read more
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44On the relevance of ignorance to the demands of moralityIn Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory, Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 51-70. 2002.In Morality, Bernard Gert argues that the fundamental demands of morality are well articulated by ten distinct, and relatively simple, rules. These rules, he holds, are such that any person, no matter what her circumstances or interests, would be rational in accepting, and guiding her choices by, them. The rules themselves are comfortably familiar (e.g. “Do not kill,” “Do not deceive,” “Keep your promises”) and sit well as intuitively plausible. Yet the rules are not, Gert argues, to be accepted…Read more
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133Hume on Practical Morality and Inert ReasonIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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2509Coherentist Epistemology and Moral TheoryIn Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology, Oxford University Press. 1996.matter of knowing that -- that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is As a result, what I'll be doing is primarily defending in general -- and due. Such knowledge is embodied in a range of capacities, abilities, and skills..
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2Moral skepticismIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 464. 2010.
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173Hume and Smith on sympathy, approbation, and moral judgmentSocial Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2): 208-236. 2013.David Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception of what…Read more
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2ContractarianismIn Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Blackwell. pp. 247--267. 2000.
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201On Why Hume's “General Point of View” Isn't Ideal–and Shouldn't BeSocial Philosophy and Policy 11 (1): 202-228. 1994.It is tempting and not at all uncommon to find the striking—even noble—visage of an Ideal Observer staring out from the center of Hume's moral theory. When Hume claims, for instance, that virtue is “ whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation ,” it is only natural to think that he must have in mind not just any spectator but a spectator who is fully informed and unsullied by prejudice. And when Hume writes that “the true standard of taste and bea…Read more
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356Essays on moral realism (edited book)Cornell University Press. 1988.Introduction The Many Moral Realisms Geoffrey Sayre-McCord I. Introduction Recognizing the startling resurgence in realism, ...
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26Criminal Justice and Legal Reparations as an Alternative to Punishment 1Philosophical Issues 11 (1): 502-529. 2001.
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University of North Carolina, Chapel HillDepartment of PhilosophyMorehead-Cain Alumni Distinguished Professor
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University of EdinburghRegular Faculty (Part-time)
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |