-
Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of TruthIn Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
-
37Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of TruthPhilosophical Review 105 (1): 82. 1996.The so-called “disquotational theory of truth” has not previously been developed much beyond the thesis that saying, for example, that ‘Snow is white’ is true amounts only to saying that snow is white. Marian David has set out to see what further sense can be made of the disquotational theory, and to compare its merits with those of correspondence theories of truth. His prognosis is that an intelligible disquotational theory of truth can be developed but will suffer from drastic shortcomings tha…Read more
-
21Minimalism and the Facts About TruthIn Richard Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?, Walter De Gruyter. 2001.Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate explanation…Read more
-
487The correspondence theory of truthStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the last 2300 years this basi…Read more
-
7Knowledge-closure and skepticismIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. 2008.
-
65Truth (review)Philosophical Review 106 (3): 441-443. 1997.Schmitt allots a chapter to each of the main types of theories about truth: pragmatism, coherentism, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. He discusses various arguments for these positions and concludes that only the arguments supporting the correspondence theory are successful. Schmitt's positive case for correspondence makes up the least original part of the book. He explicitly credits Field and remarks that he is mainly concerned with making Field's difficult account more accessible —…Read more
-
51Defending Existentialism?In Maria Elisabeth Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs, Ontos. pp. 167--209. 2009.This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple resp…Read more
-
Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift Für Analytische Philosophie. Gegründet von Rudolf Haller (edited book)Brill | Rodopi. 2004.
-
165Neither mentioning 'brains in a vat' nor mentioning brains in a vat will prove that we are not brains in a vatPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 891-896. 1991.In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in which a…Read more
-
91Theories of TruthIn Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Woleński (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic. pp. 331--414. 2004.
-
92Küenne on Conceptions of Truth (review)Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1): 179-191. 2006.The review focuses on Küenne's account of truthmaking and on his minimalist approach to truth.
-
12Truth as One and Many (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4): 743-746. 2011.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011
-
17FrontmatterIn Marian David & Mauro Antonelli (eds.), Existence, Fiction, Assumption: Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy, De Gruyter. 2016.
-
39Signifier and Signified. Linguistico-Philosophical Enquiries into the Problem of Reference (review)Philosophy and History 21 (1): 31-34. 1988.
-
11A Substitutional Theory of Truth?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 182-189. 2006.University of Notre Dame.
-
8On the Roles of Trustworthiness and AcceptanceGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 93-107. 1991.Our tmst in our own trustworthiness as evaluators of tmth plays a uniquely important role in Lehrer's recent work in epistemology. Lehrer has claimed that a person who trusts in her own trustworthiness has a reason for accepting everything she accepts, including that she is trustworthy. This claim is too bold, trust in our trustworthiness cannot play the epistemic role Lehrer assigns to it. Neither does a suitably revised version of the claim succeed in assigning any important epistemic role to …Read more
-
Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI (edited book)de Gruyter. 2016.
-
117Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working HypothesisIn Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd Edition, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 363-377. 2008.
-
19Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 229-232. 1993.
-
166Kim's functionalismPhilosophical Perspectives 11 133-48. 1997.In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two gener…Read more
-
3Truth-making and correspondenceIn E. Jonathan Lowe & Adolf Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-Making, Mcgill-queen's University Press. 2008.
-
30Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common SenseGrazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 3-16. 1986.Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage n…Read more
-
88Quine's ladder: Two and a half pages from the philosophy of logicMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 274-312. 2008.I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth
-
8Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift Für Analytische Philosophie (edited book)Brill | Rodopi. 2002.Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles Massimiliano Vignolo: Why Non-Factualists Should Love Conceptual Role Semantics Jeffrey Goodman: Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts Alberto Voltolini: Against Against Fictional Realism Roderick Batchelor: Grounds and Consequences Timm Lampert and Michael Baumgartner: The Problem of Validity Proofs Ish Haji: On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility Matthias Neuber: Philosophie der modernen Physik …Read more
-
5Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a VatPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 891-896. 1991.
-
34Review Essay: Working Without a Net (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 943-952. 1996.
-
40Lynch's functionalist theory of truthIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 42. 2012.
-
8Truth as the Epistemic GoalIn Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169. 2001.
Graz, Styria, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |