•  163
    Kim's functionalism
    Philosophical Perspectives 11 133-48. 1997.
    In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two gener…Read more
  •  3
    Truth-making and correspondence
    In E. Jonathan Lowe & Adolf Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-Making, Mcgill-queen's University Press. 2008.
  •  29
    Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common Sense
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 3-16. 1986.
    Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage n…Read more
  •  88
    Quine's ladder: Two and a half pages from the philosophy of logic
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 274-312. 2008.
    I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth
  •  8
    Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles Massimiliano Vignolo: Why Non-Factualists Should Love Conceptual Role Semantics Jeffrey Goodman: Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts Alberto Voltolini: Against Against Fictional Realism Roderick Batchelor: Grounds and Consequences Timm Lampert and Michael Baumgartner: The Problem of Validity Proofs Ish Haji: On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility Matthias Neuber: Philosophie der modernen Physik …Read more
  •  37
    Review Essay: Working Without a Net (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 943-952. 1996.
  •  40
    Lynch's functionalist theory of truth
    In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 42. 2012.
  •  8
    Truth as the Epistemic Goal
    In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169. 2001.
  • Horwich's World
    In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  8
    Some t-biconditionals
    In B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court. pp. 382--419. 2005.
    The T-biconditionals, also known as T-sentences or T-equivalences, play a very prominent role in contemporary work on truth. It is widely held that they are so central to our understanding of truth that conformance with them is indispensable to any account of truth that aspires to be adequate. Even “deflationists” and “inflationists” tend to agree on this point; their debate turns largely on just how central a role these biconditionals can play in a theory of truth. In the present paper, I want …Read more
  •  12
    Propositionen
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1): 37-58. 1985.
    Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im …Read more
  •  53
    Non-Existence and Reid's Conception of Conceiving
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 585-599. 1985.
    Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve…Read more
  •  25
    The Metaphysics of Gottlob Frege (review)
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 210-212. 1984.
  •  52
    Kim's Functionalism
    Noûs 31 (S11): 133-148. 1997.
  •  24
    According to a classical correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true iff it corresponds to a fact. The approach has its competitors. One of them, the identity theory of truth, pushes for a surprising simplification. It says that true propositions do not correspond to facts, they are facts. Some find this view too bizarre to be taken seriously. Some are attracted to it because they worry that the correspondence theory opens a gap between our thoughts and reality--a gap that, once opened…Read more
  •  6
    Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common Sense
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 3-16. 1986.
    Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage n…Read more
  •  145
    Review: From a Deflationary Point of View (review)
    Mind 116 (462): 427-434. 2007.
    The review of this collection is primarily concerned with essays pertaining to Horwich's deflationary approaches to truth and meaning.
  •  97
    Armstrong on truthmaking
    In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 141. 2005.
    Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, rai…Read more
  •  89
    On 'truth is good'
    Philosophical Books 46 (4): 292-301. 2005.
    As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).
  •  16
    Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 943-952. 1996.
  •  55
    Lehrer on trustworthiness and acceptance
    Philosophical Studies 161 (1): 7-15. 2012.
    The paper explores Lehrer's notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer's views on these topics have evolved over the years
  •  103
    Roderick Chisholm appears to agree with Kant on the question of the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. But Chisholm’s conception of the a priori is a traditional Aristotelian conception and differs markedly from Kant’s. Closer scrutiny reveals that their agreement on the question of the synthetic a priori is merely verbal: what Kant meant to affirm, Chisholm denies. Curiously, it looks as if Chisholm agreed on all substantive issues with the empiricist rejection of Kant’s synthetic a pri…Read more
  •  41
    Introduction to: Definitions
    Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3): 111-114. 1993.
  •  33
    Sprache und Ontologie (review)
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 22 199-201. 1984.
  •  114
    Content essentialism
    Acta Analytica 17 (1): 103-114. 2002.
    The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvio…Read more