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21Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2000.The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the volume and virulence of …Read more
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102Liberal exclusions and foundationalismEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 103-120. 1998.Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one …Read more
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6Balance and Refinement, beyond Coherence Methods of Moral InquiryErkenntnis 42 (3): 413-417. 1993.
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99Truth consequentialism, withholding and proportioning belief to the evidencePhilosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
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256Naivete and corruption in moral inquiryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4): 619-635. 1988.
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86Character Traits, Virtues, and VicesThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 141-157. 2000.Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Pl…Read more
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12Comments on Two of Depaul’s PuzzlesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 636-639. 2002.I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory pleasure. Would it make sense to say that what S is attitudinally pleased by is the state of affairs consistin…Read more
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4Ugly Analyses and ValueIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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110Supervenience and moral dependencePhilosophical Studies 51 (3). 1987.One aim philosophers have in constructing moral theories is to identify the natural or non-Moral characteristics that make actions right or obligatory, Things good, Or persons virtuous. Yet we have no clear understanding of what it is for certain of a thing's non-Moral properties to be responsible for its moral properties. Given the recent interest in the concept of supervenience one might think that the dependence of moral on natural properties could be explained in terms of it. Unfortunately, …Read more
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42Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
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CoherentismIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
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45The highest moral knowledge and the truth behind internalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 137-160. 1991.
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125Pyrrhonian moral skepticism and the problem of the criterionPhilosophical Issues 19 (1): 38-56. 2009.No Abstract
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86Intuitions in moral inquiryIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 595--623. 2006.This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers mu…Read more
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21Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral InquiryRoutledge. 1993.We all have moral beliefs. But what if one beleif conflicts with another? DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. It is not just the arguments that need to be considered in moral enquiry. DePaul asserts that the ability to make sensitive moral judgements is vital to any philosophical inquiry into morality. The inquirer must consider how her life experiences and experiences with literature, film and theatre have influence…Read more
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1Wiggins, D. "Needs Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value" (review)Mind 99 (n/a): 619. 1990.
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76Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the CriterionPhilosophical Papers 40 (3): 287-304. 2011.Abstract In Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa continues his detailed and intriguing defense of his two level account of knowledge that recognizes both animal and reflective knowledge. The latter more impressive type of knowledge requires a coherent positive epistemic perspective defending the reliability of a source of belief. Viewing Sosa's discussion from the through the lens provided by R.M. Chisholm's treatments of the problem of the criterion, I worry that Sosa's approach is too far in the …Read more
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18Moral Realism and the Foundations of EthicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |