Michael DePaul

Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a distinguished group of philosophers and psychologists to discuss these important issues. Students and scholars in both fields will find this book to be of great value.

This chapter examines an argument that a number of philosophers have recently employed to show that something ordinarily considered valuable is not, in fact, valuable. The argument begins by emphasizing that the analysis of the concept of the putatively valuable thing is a ‘hodgepodge,’ ‘gerrymandered,’ ‘an ad hoc sprawl,’—in short, ugly. Reflecting upon the ugly analysis, we are supposed to intuitively judge that ‘things like _that_’ to lack value. The argument concludes that the putatively valuable thing is not valuable. Stephen Stich uses the argument to show true belief lacks value. The argument figures prominently in Jonathan Kvanvig's argument that knowledge has no distinctive value. Timothy Williamson flips the argument: since knowledge is obviously valuable, but its analyses have been forced to become increasingly ugly, knowledge is not analysable. This form of argument is rejected.

Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Plato of the Republic—because they are pretty much exactly what these theorists would have predicted. The more difficult thesis that virtuous or vicious character traits exist, I do not here argue. Instead, the results of this paper focus on clarifying some of the ways in which character traits are understood by virtue ethicists, especially those who look to the classical philosophers.

One aim philosophers have in constructing moral theories is to identify the natural or non-Moral characteristics that make actions right or obligatory, Things good, Or persons virtuous. Yet we have no clear understanding of what it is for certain of a thing's non-Moral properties to be responsible for its moral properties. Given the recent interest in the concept of supervenience one might think that the dependence of moral on natural properties could be explained in terms of it. Unfortunately, None of the definitions of supervenience offered so far is adequate to this task, And indeed, There is some reason to think that this dependence relation is ultimately mysterious.

The idea of a virtue has traditionally been important in ethics, but only recently has gained attention as an idea that can explain how we ought to form beliefs as well as how we ought to act. Moral philosophers and epistemologists have different approaches to the idea of intellectual virtue; here, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski bring work from both fields together for the first time to address all of the important issues. It will be required reading for anyone working on either side of the debate.

I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory pleasure. Would it make sense to say that what S is attitudinally pleased by is the state of affairs consisting of S’s imagining p rather than p? I don’t think this will do. It seems possible for S to take pleasure in the imagined state of affairs, p, but not in the state of affairs of S’s imagining p. Consider the case of Chastity, who has had a puritanical upbringing. One day Chastity imagines a torrid romantic encounter with one of her co-workers. Quite in spite of herself, Chastity is pleased by the state of affairs which she merely imagines. But her upbringing has left its mark on her, so she feels very guilty about allowing her thoughts to run in such an unwholesome direction. Chastity is pained by the state of affairs consisting in her imagining the encounter.

In Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa continues his detailed and intriguing defense of his two level account of knowledge that recognizes both animal and reflective knowledge. The latter more impressive type of knowledge requires a coherent positive epistemic perspective defending the reliability of a source of belief. Viewing Sosa's discussion from the through the lens provided by R.M. Chisholm's treatments of the problem of the criterion, I worry that Sosa's approach is too far in the methodist direction. As a result, it is in danger of being unable to allow that paradigm examples of certain beliefs are indeed certain, e.g., the beliefs normal adults form in simple arithmetic truths under normal circumstances. I urge an approach closer to particularism that grants more weight to such paradigm particular cases. I also suggest that such an approach might actually align well with Sosa's coherentist sympathies.

Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John Rawls, is also known for being one of the first advocates of reflective equilibrium, which is clearly a coherentist approach to theory construction and justification. I will begin in Park I by making my charge against an almost embarrassingly crude presentation of the liberal position. Then in Part II I will leap to Rawls' version of liberalism, obviously by far the most sophisticated working out of the position, and try to see whether anything remains of my criticism.

We all have moral beliefs. But what if one beleif conflicts with another? DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. It is not just the arguments that need to be considered in moral enquiry. DePaul asserts that the ability to make sensitive moral judgements is vital to any philosophical inquiry into morality. The inquirer must consider how her life experiences and experiences with literature, film and theatre have influenced her capacity for making moral judgments and attempt to ensure that this capacity is neither naive nor corrupted.