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107
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16Moral statusesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (4). 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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145Argument and Perception: The Role of Literature in Moral InquiryJournal of Philosophy 85 (10): 552-565. 1988.
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26The Rationality of Belief in God: MICHAEL R. DEPAULReligious Studies 17 (3): 343-356. 1981.In the introduction to his account of the debate concerning religion between Cleanthes, Philo and Demea, Pamphilus remarks that ‘reasonable men may be allowed to differ where no one can reasonably be positive’. Pamphilus goes on to suggest that natural theology is an area that abounds with issues about which ‘no one can reasonably be positive’. Assuming that the beliefs of reasonable men are themselves reasonable, Pamphilus can be interpreted as holding that If no one is reasonably positive that…Read more
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21Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2000.The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the volume and virulence of …Read more
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97Liberal exclusions and foundationalismEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 103-120. 1998.Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one …Read more
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5Balance and Refinement, beyond Coherence Methods of Moral InquiryErkenntnis 42 (3): 413-417. 1993.
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96Truth consequentialism, withholding and proportioning belief to the evidencePhilosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
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256Naivete and corruption in moral inquiryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4): 619-635. 1988.
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85Character Traits, Virtues, and VicesThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 141-157. 2000.Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Pl…Read more
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12Comments on Two of Depaul’s PuzzlesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 636-639. 2002.I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory pleasure. Would it make sense to say that what S is attitudinally pleased by is the state of affairs consistin…Read more
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4Ugly Analyses and ValueIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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109Supervenience and moral dependencePhilosophical Studies 51 (3). 1987.One aim philosophers have in constructing moral theories is to identify the natural or non-Moral characteristics that make actions right or obligatory, Things good, Or persons virtuous. Yet we have no clear understanding of what it is for certain of a thing's non-Moral properties to be responsible for its moral properties. Given the recent interest in the concept of supervenience one might think that the dependence of moral on natural properties could be explained in terms of it. Unfortunately, …Read more
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42Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
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CoherentismIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
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42The highest moral knowledge and the truth behind internalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 137-160. 1991.
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |