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68The Tripartite Role of Belief: Evidence, Truth, and ActionRes Philosophica 94 (2): 1-18. 2017.Belief and credence are often characterized in three different ways—they ought to govern our actions, they ought to be governed by our evidence, and they ought to aim at the truth. If one of these roles is to be central, we need to explain why the others should be features of the same mental state rather than separate ones. If multiple roles are equally central, then this may cause problems for some traditional arguments about what belief and credence must be like. I read the history of formal a…Read more
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66Principal Values and Weak ExpectationsMind 123 (490): 517-531. 2014.This paper evaluates a recent method proposed by Jeremy Gwiazda for calculating the value of gambles that fail to have expected values in the standard sense. I show that Gwiazda’s method fails to give answers for many gambles that do have standardly defined expected values. However, a slight modification of his method (based on the mathematical notion of the ‘Cauchy principal value’ of an integral), is in fact a proper extension of both his method and the method of ‘weak expectations’. I show th…Read more
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66Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth (review)Philosophical Review 117 (2): 296-299. 2008.
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48Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief (review)Philosophical Review 125 (1): 143-148. 2016.
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37Rebutting and undercutting in mathematicsPhilosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 146-162. 2015.In my () I argued that a central component of mathematical practice is that published proofs must be “transferable” — that is, they must be such that the author's reasons for believing the conclusion are shared directly with the reader, rather than requiring the reader to essentially rely on testimony. The goal of this paper is to explain this requirement of transferability in terms of a more general norm on defeat in mathematical reasoning that I will call “convertibility”. I begin by discussin…Read more
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31Review of Michael frauchiger, Wilhelm K. Essler (eds.), Representation, Evidence, and Justification: Themes From Suppes (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1). 2009.
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3Varieties of Conditional ProbabilityIn Prasanta Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics, North Holland. 2011.I consider the notions of logical probability, degree of belief, and objective chance, and argue that a different formalism for conditional probability is appropriate for each.
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University of California, IrvineThe Department of Logic and Philosophy of ScienceAssociate Professor
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Irvine, California, United States of America