•  19
    Reported Miracles (review)
    Philosophical Review 105 (4): 538-540. 1996.
    Joseph Houston’s book is a fine contribution to the philosophical investigation of the value of miracle reports for religious apologetics. It covers a wide range of arguments of interest to philosophers about the concept of miracles and the justifiability of belief in their occurrence, but it is also rich in theological and biblical sources. Houston’s reasoning throughout is careful and subtle, but neither technical nor excessively pedantic. So while the book is primarily intended for scholars, …Read more
  •  251
    Ethical and epistemic egoism and the ideal of autonomy
    Episteme 4 (3): 252-263. 2007.
    In this paper I distinguish three degrees of epistemic egoism, each of which has an ethical analogue, and I argue that all three are incoherent. Since epistemic autonomy is frequently identified with one of these forms of epistemic egoism, it follows that epistemic autonomy as commonly understood is incoherent. I end with a brief discussion of the idea of moral autonomy and suggest that its component of epistemic autonomy in the realm of the moral is problematic
  •  71
    Virtues of the Mind, Selections
    In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Epistemology: An Anthology, Blackwell. pp. 442. 2008.
  •  83
    Omniscience and the Arrow of Time
    Faith and Philosophy 19 (4): 503-519. 2002.
  •  201
    An accessible and engaging introduction to the philosophy of religion. Written with verve and clarity by a leading philosopher and contributor to the field Places key issues and debates in the philosophy of religion in their historical contexts, highlighting the conditions that led to the development of the field Addresses the core topics, among them the the existence of God, the problem of evil, death and the afterlife, and the problem of religious diversity Rich with argument, yet never obtrus…Read more
  •  249
    Does Ethics Need God?
    Faith and Philosophy 4 (3): 294-303. 1987.
    This essay presents a moral argument for the rationality of theistic belief. If all I have to go on morally are my own moral intuitions and reasoning and those of others, I am rationally led to skepticism, both about the possibility of moral knowledge and about my moral effectiveness. This skepticism is extensive, amounting to moral despair. But such despair cannot be rational. It follows that the assumption of the argument must be false and I must be able to rely on more than my own human power…Read more