•  199
    Epistemic Trust
    Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2): 113-117. 2003.
    The value of epistemic trust has been neglected, as Townsley rightly observes, but I think a virtue epistemology of the kind I endorse is well suited to provide a framework for understanding it. The Cassandra of Greek legend illustrates the complex relationships among epistemic and non-epistemic goods, as well as the fragility of knowledge. I think her case leads us to a more radical conclusion than the one Townsley proposes.
  •  164
    Omnisubjectivity: Why It Is a Divine Attribute
    Nova et Vetera 14 (2): 435-450. 2016.
  •  1
    Divine Motivation Theory
    Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225): 629-632. 2006.
  •  3703
    The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
    Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2): 12-28. 2003.
    Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not a…Read more
  •  27
    Being and Goodness (review)
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66 (3): 389-392. 1992.
  •  63
    Must knowers be agents
    In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 142--57. 2001.
  •  735
    An agent-based approach to the problem of evil
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (3). 1996.
  •  217
    Admiration and the Admirable
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1): 205-221. 2015.
    The category of the admirable has received little attention in the history of philosophy, even among virtue ethicists. I don't think we can understand the admirable without investigating the emotion of admiration. I have argued that admiration is an emotion in which the object is ‘seen as admirable’, and which motivates us to emulate the admired person in the relevant respect. Our judgements of admirability can be distorted by the malfunction of our disposition to admiration. We all know many wa…Read more
  •  37
    Reported Miracles: A Critique of Hume
    with Joseph Houston
    Philosophical Review 105 (4): 538. 1996.
    Joseph Houston’s book is a fine contribution to the philosophical investigation of the value of miracle reports for religious apologetics. It covers a wide range of arguments of interest to philosophers about the concept of miracles and the justifiability of belief in their occurrence, but it is also rich in theological and biblical sources. Houston’s reasoning throughout is careful and subtle, but neither technical nor excessively pedantic. So while the book is primarily intended for scholars, …Read more
  •  152
    Foreknowledge and Free Will
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
  •  445
    Responses
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 207-219. 2000.
  •  10
    Virtue Theory and Exemplars
    Philosophical News 4. 2012.
    This essay outlines an approach to virtue theory that makes the foundation of the theory direct reference to virtuous exemplars, modeled on the famous theory of direct reference, devised in the seventies by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke. The basic idea is that exemplars are persons like that, just as water is liquid like that, and humans are members of the same species as that, and so on. In this theory exemplars are picked out directly through the emotion of admiration rather than through the s…Read more
  •  48
    Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy
    Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3): 252-263. 2007.