Linda Zagzebski

This article examines the potential conflict between faith and reason, with emphasis on the relation between beliefs arising from revelation and beliefs arising from reason. It analyses the reasonableness or unreasonableness of faith, focusing on the conditions that make believing what one is told reasonable, or unreasonable, and the sense of reasonable intended when applied to faith. In order to have a method for determining the reasonableness of a belief, it considers two kinds of epistemic reasons: theoretical and deliberative. The chapter argues that trust in ourselves when we are epistemically conscientious is more basic than either theoretical or deliberative reasons, and more basic than any norms of reasoning. It concludes by considering the place of faith in the epistemically conscientious person and suggesting that faith has a component of belief on the word of God which does not conflict with reason directly, but which can be reasonable or unreasonable.

The problem of divine foreknowledge forces the religious person to give up one of a pair of beliefs both of which are central to Christian practice. These beliefs are, first, that God has infallibly true beliefs about everything that will happen in the future, and second, that human beings have free will in a sense of the “free” is something that is incompatible with determinism. A strong form of the dilemma of foreknowledge can be generated from just two properties that are consequences of essential omniscience: the property of knowing the future and infallibility. This chapter presents the strongest general form of the dilemma it can devise and shows how it differs from weaker foreknowledge dilemmas and from the problem of future truth. This chapter also argues that the premise of the necessity of the past is much more plausible in the argument for theological fatalism than in the argument for logical fatalism. It examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will—those arising from William of Ockham, Luis de Molina, and Boethius.

Perhaps the most ingenious solution to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and freedom was devised by the 16th-century Jesuit philosopher, Luis de Molina, in his theory of scientia media, or middle knowledge. Middle knowledge is said to be the knowledge of what any possible free creature would freely choose in any possible circumstance. Molina called it “middle” knowledge because it stands midway between God's natural knowledge, or his knowledge of what is necessary and possible, and God's free knowledge, or his knowledge of what is actual. Middle knowledge is like free knowledge and unlike natural knowledge in that its objects are metaphysically contingent propositions. All of God's natural knowledge, in contrast, is of metaphysically necessary propositions. The objects of middle knowledge are supposed to include propositions such as the following: “If Peter were asked if he knows Christ, he would deny it” and “If Elizabeth were offered a grant, she would accept it.” In modern parlance, conditionals such as these are called counterfactuals of freedom.

It is often thought that physical laws just are generalized subjunctive conditionals expressing relations between physical events. Metaphysical laws, on the other hand, seem to be more than the subjunctive conditionals grounded in them. This makes it much more difficult to give a positive account of the causal relations between nomically equivalent events that are related by metaphysical laws. No positive solution to the divine foreknowledge dilemma can be given until a very comprehensive explanation of the relationship between God and contingent events has been given. John Pollock defines a strong subjunctive conditional in which transitivity and adjunctivity are built in, but even then he finds that the resulting conditional is not sufficient for defining the causal relation, and he has to add the provision that the antecedent expresses a condition prior in time to the consequent. Pollock concludes that since no counterfactual condition can distinguish between nomically equivalent states of affairs, no purely counterfactual analysis of causation can succeed.

This chapter proposes two more solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and argues that they solve both the Accidental Necessity Version of the dilemma and what is termed the Timeless Knowledge Dilemma. It revisits the argument against free will from accidental necessity, which includes the statement “If when I bring about an act I cannot do otherwise, I do not bring it about freely.” It proposes a solution that denies this proposition. It asserts that even if all of a person's acts are accidentally necessary, they can still be done freely in a sense of the “free” that is incompatible with determinism. Harry Frankfurt has introduced a class of examples that can be taken to be counterexamples to the proposition mentioned above. The focus of his discussion is on the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and moral responsibility, but his examples can also be used to illustrate the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and acting freely.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the Accidental Necessity Version of the divine foreknowledge dilemma is very strong. In addition, there is the problem of the Causal Necessity Version. This chapter examines one classic response that would solve the differences between both of these. The move comes from Boethius and Saint Thomas Aquinas, but it has roots in the writing of Proclus and Ammonius. This is the claim that God does not have beliefs in time at all. The strongest forms of the foreknowledge dilemma make the assumption that in every possible world in which one does some act S, God previously believes that he will do S and the belief is infallible. This assumption, together with the principle of the Necessity of the Past and a Transfer of the Necessity Principle, leads to the conclusion that the person does not bring about S freely. This chapter preseents the infallibility version of the argument and discusses the timelessness solution, arguing that it generates another dilemma and therefore should not be considered a solution to the foreknowledge problem.

Perhaps the most widely discussed solution to the divine foreknowledge dilemma in recent years is the Ockhamist solution. Many variations of it have been proposed, and some are probably not very close to the original ntentions of William of Ockham. This chapter considers a solution which is Ockhamist in spirit as it takes accidental necessity seriously and at least initially identifies it with the necessity of the past. It assumes that God exists in time, and also denies that God's beliefs are accidentally necessary. The general idea behind this solution is that even though God had beliefs in the past, and even though the past is accidentally necessary, God's beliefs nonetheless escape accidental necessity. This chapter also discusses what is known as Thomistic Ockhamism and proposes a solution to the timeless knowledge dilemma.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski here explains and defends the idea that the God of the monotheistic religions does not only know all objective facts, but he also perfectly grasps the conscious states of all conscious beings from their own point of view. She calls that property omnisubjectivity. God not only knows that you are in pain, for instance, but is present in your pain, grasping your pain the way you grasp it. The same point applies to every feeling, every belief, every thought, every desire you have. It also applies to the conscious states of animals. Zagzebski begins with an account of what subjectivity is and why it differs from anything in the objective world, then argues that omnisubjectivity is entailed by divine omniscience and omnipresence, divine love and justice, and practices of prayer. She offers three models of how omnisubjectivity is possible: the empathy model, the perceptual model, and panentheism. She answers objections that it is incompatible with other attributes such as timelessness, immutability, impassibility, divine goodness, divine holiness, and infinity. She extends the account of omnisubjectivity to the divine grasp of possible but non-actual subjective states, arguing that God grasps all possible subjective states of all possible conscious beings in his imagination. She then applies the conclusions of the book to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Many arguments in the book apply to all the monotheistic religions and some arguments apply to monotheistic Hinduism. The book concludes with the claim that subjectivity is primary in the universe. God is intrinsically subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Objectivity is being from the outside viewpoint, and it exists only relative to the created world.

It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails.

This anthology offers a comprehensive historical introduction to the central questions of philosophy of religion. Approximately two-thirds of the selections are from ancient, medieval, and modern sources, helping students to understand and engage the rich traditions of reflection on these timeless questions. The remaining contemporary readings introduce students to the more recent developments in the field. Each of the thematically arranged sections begins with an editor's introduction to clarify the central issues and positions presented in the readings that follow."--Book jacket.

Is ethics all about rights and duties, or is it about living a happy, flourishing life? For millennia in the West, ethics was about the way to flourish as an individual and a community. The qualities that enable people to live that way are the virtues, and that style of ethics is called Virtue Ethics. In the early modern period, Virtue Ethics went out of fashion and ethics began to focus on right and duties, where rights and duties are demands made against others. In this article I argue that the language of rights and duties has made it almost impossible for people on opposing sides of public policy issues to come to agreement. I defend the return of Virtue Ethics in philosophy, and propose that if it can be adopted by ordinary people, we will have a better chance at overcoming our deep divisions.

The heart of the epistemological interest of Zagzebski’s book is found in the tasks of clarifying the natures of justification and knowledge in terms of the intellectual virtues. It is in virtue of undertaking this task that Zagzebski presents a version of virtue epistemology. Though the book has several interesting features apart from this task, I want to argue that in its fundamental tasks, the book is a failure. In particular, I will argue that Zagzebski’s virtue account of justification is irreparably inadequate

The title of Hare’s book refers to the gap between the demand that morality places on us and our natural capacity to live by it. Such a gap is paradoxical if we accept the “‘ought’ implies ‘can”’ principle. The solution, Hare argues, is that the gap is filled by the Christian God. So we ought to be moral and can do so—with divine assistance. Hare’s statement and defense of the existence of the gap combines a rigorously Kantian notion of the moral demand with a rigorously Calvinist notion of human depravity. As such, many readers will find the gap exaggerated, but most people will admit that there is some sort of gap here to be faced, and any gap at all is a problem.

Greco argues that knowledge by transmission involves joint agency whose norms are governed by the quality of the social relations in the transmission, and these norms differ from the norms generating knowledge in the source. This approach to the transmission of knowledge allows Greco to respond to three common arguments against the rationality of religious belief on testimony: the argument against belief in miracles, the argument from luck, and the argument from peer disagreement. I agree with Greco’s position on the transmission of knowledge or reasonable belief in these cases and argue that the distinction between first person and third person reasons for belief can strengthen his position. The experience upon which a belief is based can be transferred intersubjectively and strengthens the ground for the belief based on experience, including the belief in miracles. Trust is another first person reason for belief, not only a background condition for reasonable transmission, and it also can be transmitted and is an important component in the formation and preservation of traditions. This feature permits a reply to the arguments from luck and from disagreement with people outside the tradition. But this feature also shows why we find these arguments threatening since we are rationally committed to a minimal degree of trust in all other reasonable persons.

This chapter defends the rationality of basic emotional self-trust, or trust that our emotion dispositions reliably produce emotions that fit their objects when they survive conscientious reflection upon one’s total set of emotions and beliefs. The argument proceeds from the assumption that states of emotion can be fitting or non-fitting, just as beliefs can be true or false, and what we call being justified or rational in an emotion is doing the best we can to make our emotions fit their objects, just as what we call being justified or rational in a belief is doing the best we can to make our beliefs true. Ultimately, the justification of our emotions is circular for the same reason that the justification of our beliefs is circular, and the rational response to both kinds of circularity is self-trust. Many emotions are less trustworthy than many kinds of beliefs, but there are no grounds for general emotion scepticism. The chapter concludes with some brief thoughts on the ethical implications of emotional self-trust.

Two simple yet tremendously powerful ideas that shaped virtually every aspect of civilization This book is a breathtaking examination of the two greatest ideas in human history. The first is the idea that the human mind can grasp the universe. The second is the idea that the human mind can grasp itself. Acclaimed philosopher Linda Zagzebski shows how the first unleashed a cultural awakening that swept across the world in the first millennium BCE, giving birth to philosophy, mathematics, science, and virtually all the major world religions. It dominated until the Renaissance, when the discovery of subjectivity profoundly transformed the arts and sciences. This second great idea governed our perception of reality up until the dawn of the twenty-first century. Zagzebski explores how the interplay of the two ideas led to conflicts that have left us ambivalent about the relationship between the mind and the universe, and have given rise to a host of moral and political rifts over the deepest questions human beings face. Should we organize civil society around the ideal of living in harmony with the world or that of individual autonomy? Zagzebski explains how the two greatest ideas continue to divide us today over issues such as abortion, the environment, free speech, and racial and gender identity. This panoramic book reveals what is missing in our conception of ourselves and the world, and imagines a not-too-distant future when a third great idea, the idea that human minds can grasp each other, will help us gain an idea of the whole of reality.

In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply to authority in the moral and religious domains

Transcendental arguments against skepticism argue that the skeptical argument depends on, as a necessary condition for its formulation, the falsehood—or, more weakly, the unbelievability—of the skeptical hypothesis. In this chapter, I offer a series of arguments that the skeptic’s hypothesis needs to presuppose the moral or practical rationality of the subject, requiring either the existence of an external world with certain features (strongest arguments), the falsehood of the skeptical hypothesis (strong arguments), or the subject’s belief in such a world (weak arguments). In all the proposed transcendental arguments, the states of the agent requiring the falsehood or unbelievability of the skeptical hypothesis are not representational states such as the beliefs the skeptic asks the subject to doubt. I begin with an argument from rational agency, and I then investigate the sense of moral obligation, moral motives, and virtues in the vat, and argue that although the skeptic needs to presuppose the rational and moral agency of the subject, the skeptical hypothesis denies or undermines the subject’s agency. I end by considering whether the skeptic can retreat to Pyrrhonian skepticism to save the skeptical project, and I conclude that he cannot.