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368Exemplarist virtue theoryMetaphilosophy 41 (1-2): 41-57. 1996.Abstract: In this essay I outline a radical kind of virtue theory I call exemplarism, which is foundational in structure but which is grounded in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which anchors all the moral concepts in the theory. I compare several different kinds of moral theory by the way they relate the concepts of the good, a right act, and a virtue. In the theory I propose, these concepts, along with the concepts of a duty and of a good life, are defined by reference to exem…Read more
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8Virtue in Ethics and EpistemologyProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 1-17. 1997.
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326Epistemic Authority and Its CriticsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 169--187. 2014.
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38OmnisubjectivityIn L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 231-248. 2013.
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139The Moral Gap (review)Philosophical Review 108 (2): 291-293. 1999.The title of Hare’s book refers to the gap between the demand that morality places on us and our natural capacity to live by it. Such a gap is paradoxical if we accept the “‘ought’ implies ‘can”’ principle. The solution, Hare argues, is that the gap is filled by the Christian God. So we ought to be moral and can do so—with divine assistance. Hare’s statement and defense of the existence of the gap combines a rigorously Kantian notion of the moral demand with a rigorously Calvinist notion of huma…Read more
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8Christian MonotheismFaith and Philosophy 6 (1): 3-18. 1989.In this paper I present an argument that there can be no more than one God in a way which allows me to give the doctrine ofthe Trinity logical priority over the attributes traditionally used in arguments for God’s unicity. The argument that there is at most one God makes no assumptions about the particular attributes included in divinity. It uses only the Identity of Indiscemibles and a Principle of Plenitude. I then offer a theory on the relationship between individuals and kinds which allows m…Read more
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1Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free WillIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 45-64. 2001.
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6Intellectual motivation and the good of truthIn Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 135--154. 2003.
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33Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2001.Virtue Epistemology is a new movement receiving the bulk of recent attention from top epistemologists and ethicists; this volume reflects the best work in that vein. Included are unpublished articles by such eminent philosophers as Robert Audi, Simon Blackburn, Alvin Goldman, Christopher Hookway, Keith Lehrer, and Ernest Sosa
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117First Person and Third Person Reasons and Religious EpistemologyEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2). 2011.In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal -- what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal -- what I call theoretical reasons. I argue that attending to this distinction illuminates a host of problems in epistemology in general and in religious epistemology in particular. These problems include (a) the way religious experience operates as a reason for religious belief, (b) how we ought to understand religious …Read more
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11Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (edited book)Notre Dame Press. 1993.Rational Faith contains nine new essays by Catholic philosophers who critically evaluate the recent work of the Reformed epistemologists, including Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff and George Mavrodes. Although the contributors employ a distinctly Catholic perspective, their papers are by no means wholly polemical; instead, each reflects an appreciation of the importance of Reformed epistemology and its impact on contemporary religious philosophy.
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9What if the impossible had been actualIn Michael D. Beaty (ed.), Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 165--183. 1990.
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1Epistemic self-trust and the consensus gentium argumentIn Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and religious belief, Oxford University Press. 2011.