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1173Ought-implies-can: Erasmus Luther and R.m. HareSophia 29 (1): 2-30. 1990.l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Fre…Read more
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1045Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E.MooreIn Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 244-260. 2007.I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the Ope…Read more
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28Is–Ought GapIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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513Coercive Theories of Meaning or Why Language Shouldn't Matter (So Much) to PhilosophyLogique Et Analyse 53 (210): 151. 2010.This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they smack of…Read more
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458A niggle at Nagel: causally active desires and the explanation of actionIn Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 220--40. 2009.This paper criticizes an influential argument from Thomas Nagel’s THE POSSIBILTIY OF ALTRUISM, an argument that plays a foundational role in the philosophies of (at least) Philippa Foot, John McDowell and Jonathan Dancy. Nagel purports to prove that a person can be can be motivated to perform X by the belief that X is likely to bring about Y, without a causally active or biffy desire for Y. If Cullity and Gaut are to be believed (ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASONING) this is widely regarded within th…Read more
Dunedin, Otago, New Zealand
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Social Science |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |