Nuel Belnap

(? - 2024)

Greenberger. Horne. Shimony, and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the branching space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible with a deterministic world nor with a world that permits correlated space-related events without a common cause.

In [6] proof tableau formulations were given of the implication/negation fragments of the important zero-order relevant logics E and R and the semirelevant logic RM . The main purpose of this paper then, is to extend results by giving proof tableau formulations of the distribution-free fragments of E, R and RM and of their first order extensions EQ, RQ and RMQ. Where X is one of these logics, we shall follow [13] in calling its distribution-free fragment OX – the ‘O’ standing for ‘ortho’ which is meant to signify the kinship of these logics to quantum logics or ortho-logics as they now tend to be known. Hence in what follows we shall refer to the logics OX simply as relevant ortho-logics

“Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered sepa-rately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the use fulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parame- ters of truth (etc.); namely, closing vs. leaving open, local vs. translocal, and anchored vs. unanchored. Basic relations among these categories are established.

This paper offers a lighthearted presentation of some of the chief ideas about truth that are shared by theories similar to those of Kripke, Herzberger, and Gupta. The problem is to explain the concept of truth for a language that contains its own truth predicate. The proposal of these theories is that one can unwind the tangles that threaten by invoking a transfinite series of stages of semantic reflection as one ascends the ordinals. The presentation emphasizes how each stage begins, to the extent that it can, with the fruits of semantic reflection at earlier stages. Special attention is given to clarifying how these theories about truth treat the three chief kinds of ordinal numbers: the initial ordinal, successor ordinals, and limit ordinals.