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20FrontmatterIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. 2017.
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15Index of namesIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 711-718. 2017.
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17Chapter XI. functions, arithmetic, and other special topicsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 392-487. 2017.
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8Chapter IX. semanticsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 142-266. 2017.
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5Chapter VII. Individual quantificationIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 70-128. 2017.
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6Summary review of volume IIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. 2017.
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13Chapter XII. Applications and discussionIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 488-564. 2017.
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11Chapter VI. the theory of entailmentIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-69. 2017.
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24Chapter VIII. Ackermann's strenge implikationIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 129-141. 2017.
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6Analytical table of contentsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. 2017.
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21Chapter X. proof theory and decidabilityIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 267-391. 2017.
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14AcknowledgmentsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. 2017.
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10Special symbolsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 747-749. 2017.
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9ContentsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. 2017.
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6PrefaceIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. 2017.
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12Index of subjectsIn J. Michael Dunn, Nuel D. Belnap & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton University Press. pp. 719-746. 2017.
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16Entailment, Vol. Ii: The Logic of Relevance and NecessityPrinceton University Press. 2017.In spite of a powerful tradition, more than two thousand years old, that in a valid argument the premises must be relevant to the conclusion, twentieth-century logicians neglected the concept of relevance until the publication of Volume I of this monumental work. Since that time relevance logic has achieved an important place in the field of philosophy: Volume II of Entailment brings to a conclusion a powerful and authoritative presentation of the subject by most of the top people working in the…Read more
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13Truth by AscentDialectica 53 (3-4): 291-306. 1999.This paper offers a lighthearted presentation of some of the chief ideas about truth that are shared by theories similar to those of Kripke, Herzberger, and Gupta. The problem is to explain the concept of truth for a language that contains its own truth predicate. The proposal of these theories is that one can unwind the tangles that threaten by invoking a transfinite series of stages of semantic reflection as one ascends the ordinals. The presentation emphasizes how each stage begins, to the ex…Read more
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18The display problemIn H. Wansing (ed.), Proof Theory of Modal Logic, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 79--93. 1996.
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8A useful four-valued logicIn J. M. Dunn & G. Epstein (eds.), Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, D. Reidel. 1977.
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43Propensities and probabilitiesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 25 (4): 358-375. 1974.
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47Stit theory (a logic of seeing-to-it-that) is applied to cases involving many agents. First treated are complex nestings of stits involving distinct agents. The discussion is driven by the logical impossibility of "a sees to it that b sees to it that Q" in the technical sense, even though that seems to make sense in everyday language, Of special utility are the concepts of "forced choice", of the creation of deontic states, and of probabilities, Second, joint agency, both plain and strict (every…Read more
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83The way of the agentStudia Logica 51 (3-4). 1992.The conditional,if an agent did something, then the agent could have done otherwise, is analyzed usingstit theory, which is a logic of seeing to it that based on agents making choices in the context of branching time. The truth of the conditional is found to be a subtle matter that depends on how it is interpreted (e.g., on what otherwise refers to, and on the difference between could and might) and also on whether or not there are busy choosers that can make infinitely many choices in a finite …Read more
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341. Rescher 1964 — henceforth HR — proposes a way of reasoning from a set of hypotheses which may include both some of our beliefs and also hypotheses contradicting those beliefs. The aim of this paper is to point out what I take to be a fault in Rescher’s proposal, and to suggest a modification of it, using a nonclassical logic, which avoids that fault. The paper neither attacks nor defends the broader aspects of Rescher’s proposal, but merely assumes that it is at least prima facie worthwhile a…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |