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71Replies to Selim Berker and Karl SchaferPhilosophical Studies 152 (1). 2011.I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliabilit…Read more
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4Précis of Empiricism and ExperiencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.
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159Empiricism and ExperienceOxford University Press USA. 2006.This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes availa…Read more
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126The Revision Theory of TruthMIT Press. 1993.In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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20Semantics of Propositional Attitudes: A Critical Study of Cresswell's "Structured Meanings"Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4). 1987.
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10Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of TruthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3): 721-727. 2007.Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from a foundationalist picture of language. The picture is attractive, and Maudlin builds on it courageously. From the formal point of view, the theory of truth that emerges is, as Maudlin observes, nothing other than the least-fixed-point theory of Saul Kripke. From the philosophical point of view, however, the differences between Maudlin’s and Kripke’s theories are large. It is these differences that lead Maudlin to claim adv…Read more
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57Partially defined predicates and semantic pathology (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2). 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
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135A theory of conditionals in the context of branching timePhilosophical Review 89 (1): 65-90. 1980.
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527Finite Circular DefinitionsIn Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference, Csli Publications. pp. 79-93. 2006.
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77Truth, Meaning, ExperienceOup Usa. 2011.This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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29Circularity, Definition and Truth (edited book)Sole distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 2000.
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54Replies to six criticsInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2). 2009.I want to thank my critics not only for their attention to my book but also for their hospitality in Valencia, where they first presented me with their stimulating and wide‐ranging criticisms. 1 Th...
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90Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truthSynthese 195 (3): 1065-1075. 2018.We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the…Read more
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114Experience and knowledgeIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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16Two theorems concerning stabilityIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60. 1990.
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50Reply to Robert KoonsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4): 632-636. 1994.We are grateful to Professor Robert Koons for his excellent, and generous, review (henceforth KR) of our book The Revision Theory of Truth (henceforth RTT). Koons provides in KR a welcome guide to our RTT, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond only to his principal objection.' This objection, which is developed on pp. 625 ââ¬â 628 of KR, calls into question our main thesis. As we argue below, however, the objection is not successful.…Read more
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51Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith SimmonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 205-222. 2006.University of Pittsburgh.
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1Partially Defined Predicates and Semantic PathologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 402-409. 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
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120Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational RolePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 717-720. 2010.
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The meaning of truthIn Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics, Academic Press. pp. 453--480. 1987.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |