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33Semantics of propositional attitudes: A critical study of Cresswell's (review)Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4): 395-410. 1987.
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62Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of Truth (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3). 2006.Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from a foundationalist picture of language. The picture is attractive, and Maudlin builds on it courageously. From the formal point of view, the theory of truth that emerges is, as Maudlin observes, nothing other than the least-fixed-point theory of Saul Kripke. From the philosophical point of view, however, the differences between Maudlin’s and Kripke’s theories are large. It is these differences that lead Maudlin to claim adv…Read more
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82Modal logic and truthJournal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1). 1978.I discuss in this paper a criticism of modal logic due to Donald Davidson and John Wallace. They have claimed that, to quote Wallace, “modal predicate calculus does not provide a reasonable standpoint from which to interpret a language” (1970, p. 147). The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate their argument for this claim
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138Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and NetaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 490-508. 2009.No Abstract
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17Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel BelnapPhilosophical Quarterly 43 (172): 399. 1993.
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721Conditionals in Theories of TruthJournal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1): 27-63. 2017.We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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100The logic of common nouns: an investigation in quantified modal logicYale University Press. 1980.
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70Replies to Selim Berker and Karl SchaferPhilosophical Studies 152 (1). 2011.I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliabilit…Read more
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4Précis of Empiricism and ExperiencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.
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157Empiricism and ExperienceOxford University Press USA. 2006.This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes availa…Read more
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122The Revision Theory of TruthMIT Press. 1993.In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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20Semantics of Propositional Attitudes: A Critical Study of Cresswell's "Structured Meanings"Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4). 1987.
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8Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of TruthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3): 721-727. 2007.Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from a foundationalist picture of language. The picture is attractive, and Maudlin builds on it courageously. From the formal point of view, the theory of truth that emerges is, as Maudlin observes, nothing other than the least-fixed-point theory of Saul Kripke. From the philosophical point of view, however, the differences between Maudlin’s and Kripke’s theories are large. It is these differences that lead Maudlin to claim adv…Read more
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54Partially defined predicates and semantic pathology (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2). 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
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504Finite Circular DefinitionsIn Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference, Csli Publications. pp. 79-93. 2006.
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135A theory of conditionals in the context of branching timePhilosophical Review 89 (1): 65-90. 1980.
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71Truth, Meaning, ExperienceOup Usa. 2011.This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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28Circularity, Definition and Truth (edited book)Sole distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 2000.
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54Replies to six criticsInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2). 2009.I want to thank my critics not only for their attention to my book but also for their hospitality in Valencia, where they first presented me with their stimulating and wide‐ranging criticisms. 1 Th...
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83Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truthSynthese 195 (3): 1065-1075. 2018.We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the…Read more
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114Experience and knowledgeIn Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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15Two theorems concerning stabilityIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60. 1990.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |