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29Circularity, Definition and Truth (edited book)Sole distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 2000.
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54Replies to six criticsInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2). 2009.I want to thank my critics not only for their attention to my book but also for their hospitality in Valencia, where they first presented me with their stimulating and wide‐ranging criticisms. 1 Th...
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85Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truthSynthese 195 (3): 1065-1075. 2018.We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the…Read more
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16Two theorems concerning stabilityIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60. 1990.
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114Experience and knowledgeIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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50Reply to Robert KoonsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4): 632-636. 1994.We are grateful to Professor Robert Koons for his excellent, and generous, review (henceforth KR) of our book The Revision Theory of Truth (henceforth RTT). Koons provides in KR a welcome guide to our RTT, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond only to his principal objection.' This objection, which is developed on pp. 625 ââ¬â 628 of KR, calls into question our main thesis. As we argue below, however, the objection is not successful.…Read more
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51Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith SimmonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 205-222. 2006.University of Pittsburgh.
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1Partially Defined Predicates and Semantic PathologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 402-409. 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
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120Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational RolePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 717-720. 2010.
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The meaning of truthIn Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics, Academic Press. pp. 453--480. 1987.
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11Review: Greg N. Carlson, Generic Terms and Generic Sentences (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (3): 858-859. 1985.
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127XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 227-246. 1989.Anil Gupta; XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 227–246, https.
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Ethical Dilemmas in Conservation of Biodiversity: Towards Developing globally acceptable ethical guidelinesEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 5 (2): 40-46. 1995.
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76A consecutive calculus for positive relevant implication with necessityJournal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4): 343-362. 1980.
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12Review of John Koethe, Skepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9). 2006.
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120Précis of empiricism and experience (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.No Abstract
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156Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 654-666. 2003.This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles tha…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |