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210Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational RolePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 717-720. 2010.
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245A theory of conditionals in the context of branching timePhilosophical Review 89 (1): 65-90. 1980.
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135A consecutive calculus for positive relevant implication with necessityJournal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4): 343-362. 1980.
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125Truth, Meaning, ExperienceOUP Usa. 2012.This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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137Replies to Selim Berker and Karl SchaferPhilosophical Studies 152 (1). 2011.I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliabilit…Read more
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Ethical Dilemmas in Conservation of Biodiversity: Towards Developing globally acceptable ethical guidelinesEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 5 (2): 40-46. 1995.
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52Two theorems concerning stabilityIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60. 1990.
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238Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of Truth (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3). 2006.Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from a foundationalist picture of language. The picture is attractive, and Maudlin builds on it courageously. From the formal point of view, the theory of truth that emerges is, as Maudlin observes, nothing other than the least-fixed-point theory of Saul Kripke. From the philosophical point of view, however, the differences between Maudlin’s and Kripke’s theories are large. It is these differences that lead Maudlin to claim adv…Read more
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The meaning of truthIn Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics, Academic Press. pp. 453--480. 1987.
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97Replies to six criticsInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2). 2009.I want to thank my critics not only for their attention to my book but also for their hospitality in Valencia, where they first presented me with their stimulating and wide‐ranging criticisms. 1 Th...
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164Modal logic and truthJournal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1). 1978.I discuss in this paper a criticism of modal logic due to Donald Davidson and John Wallace. They have claimed that, to quote Wallace, “modal predicate calculus does not provide a reasonable standpoint from which to interpret a language” (1970, p. 147). The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate their argument for this claim
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208Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and NetaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 490-508. 2009.No Abstract
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230XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 227-246. 1989.Anil Gupta; XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 227–246, https.
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123Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith SimmonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 205-222. 2006.University of Pittsburgh.
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233Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich’s Use Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 654-666. 2003.This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles tha…Read more
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61Circularity, Definition and Truth (edited book)Sole distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 2000.
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158Partially defined predicates and semantic pathology (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2). 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |