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20Semantics of Propositional Attitudes: A Critical Study of Cresswell's "Structured Meanings"Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4). 1987.
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8Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of TruthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3): 721-727. 2007.Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from a foundationalist picture of language. The picture is attractive, and Maudlin builds on it courageously. From the formal point of view, the theory of truth that emerges is, as Maudlin observes, nothing other than the least-fixed-point theory of Saul Kripke. From the philosophical point of view, however, the differences between Maudlin’s and Kripke’s theories are large. It is these differences that lead Maudlin to claim adv…Read more
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55Partially defined predicates and semantic pathology (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2). 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
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506Finite Circular DefinitionsIn Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference, Csli Publications. pp. 79-93. 2006.
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135A theory of conditionals in the context of branching timePhilosophical Review 89 (1): 65-90. 1980.
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72Truth, Meaning, ExperienceOup Usa. 2011.This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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54Replies to six criticsInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2). 2009.I want to thank my critics not only for their attention to my book but also for their hospitality in Valencia, where they first presented me with their stimulating and wide‐ranging criticisms. 1 Th...
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29Circularity, Definition and Truth (edited book)Sole distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 2000.
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84Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truthSynthese 195 (3): 1065-1075. 2018.We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the…Read more
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114Experience and knowledgeIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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16Two theorems concerning stabilityIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60. 1990.
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51Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith SimmonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 205-222. 2006.University of Pittsburgh.
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50Reply to Robert KoonsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4): 632-636. 1994.We are grateful to Professor Robert Koons for his excellent, and generous, review (henceforth KR) of our book The Revision Theory of Truth (henceforth RTT). Koons provides in KR a welcome guide to our RTT, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond only to his principal objection.' This objection, which is developed on pp. 625 ââ¬â 628 of KR, calls into question our main thesis. As we argue below, however, the objection is not successful.…Read more
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1Partially Defined Predicates and Semantic PathologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 402-409. 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |