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55In praise of a logic of definitions that tolerates ω‐inconsistencyPhilosophical Issues 28 (1): 176-195. 2018.I argue that a general logic of definitions must tolerate ω‐inconsistency. I present a semantical scheme, S, under which some definitions imply ω‐inconsistent sets of sentences. I draw attention to attractive features of this scheme, and I argue that S yields the minimal general logic of definitions. I conclude that any acceptable general logic should permit definitions that generate ω‐inconsistency. This conclusion gains support from the application of S to the theory of truth.
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24M. Chirimuuta's Adverbialism about ColorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1): 229-235. 2017.M. Chirimuuta's Outside Color is a rich and lovely book. I enjoyed reading it and benefitted from reflecting on its provocative ideas. I begin by briefly placing the book's principal thesis in its historical context, and I go on to reflect on two objections that might be lodged against this thesis.
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5Knowledge Management's Social Dimension: Lessons from Nucor SteelIn Laurence Prusak & Eric Matson (eds.), Knowledge Management and Organizational Learning: A Reader, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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Human Cognition: A Multidisciplinary PerspectiveIndian Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2): 327-346. 2003.
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114Experience and knowledgeIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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16Two theorems concerning stabilityIn J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60. 1990.
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26Replies to Marian David, Anil Gupta, and Keith SimmonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 205-222. 2006.University of Pittsburgh.
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50Reply to Robert KoonsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4): 632-636. 1994.We are grateful to Professor Robert Koons for his excellent, and generous, review (henceforth KR) of our book The Revision Theory of Truth (henceforth RTT). Koons provides in KR a welcome guide to our RTT, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond only to his principal objection.' This objection, which is developed on pp. 625 ââ¬â 628 of KR, calls into question our main thesis. As we argue below, however, the objection is not successful.…Read more
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1Partially Defined Predicates and Semantic PathologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 402-409. 2002.In three-valued languages, sentences can have one of three semantic values: true, false, and neither-true-nor-false. Correspondingly, predicates can be true, false, or neither-true-nor-false of objects. Hence the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued language needs to fix not only the extension of the predicate—the objects of which the predicate is true—but also its antiextension—the objects of which the predicate is false. In fact, the interpretation of a predicate in a three-valued l…Read more
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39Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational RolePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 717-720. 2010.
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The meaning of truthIn Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics, Academic Press. pp. 453--480. 1987.
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11Review: Greg N. Carlson, Generic Terms and Generic Sentences (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (3): 858-859. 1985.
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Ethical Dilemmas in Conservation of Biodiversity: Towards Developing globally acceptable ethical guidelinesEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 5 (2): 40-46. 1995.
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65XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 227-246. 1989.Anil Gupta; XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 227–246, https.
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72A consecutive calculus for positive relevant implication with necessityJournal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4): 343-362. 1980.
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12Review of John Koethe, Skepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9). 2006.
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120Précis of empiricism and experience (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.No Abstract
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46Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 654-666. 2003.This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles tha…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |