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76A consecutive calculus for positive relevant implication with necessityJournal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4): 343-362. 1980.
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12Review of John Koethe, Skepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9). 2006.
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120Précis of empiricism and experience (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.No Abstract
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155Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 654-666. 2003.This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles tha…Read more
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33Semantics of propositional attitudes: A critical study of Cresswell's (review)Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4): 395-410. 1987.
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61Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of Truth (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3). 2006.Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from a foundationalist picture of language. The picture is attractive, and Maudlin builds on it courageously. From the formal point of view, the theory of truth that emerges is, as Maudlin observes, nothing other than the least-fixed-point theory of Saul Kripke. From the philosophical point of view, however, the differences between Maudlin’s and Kripke’s theories are large. It is these differences that lead Maudlin to claim adv…Read more
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82Modal logic and truthJournal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1). 1978.I discuss in this paper a criticism of modal logic due to Donald Davidson and John Wallace. They have claimed that, to quote Wallace, “modal predicate calculus does not provide a reasonable standpoint from which to interpret a language” (1970, p. 147). The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate their argument for this claim
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17Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel BelnapPhilosophical Quarterly 43 (172): 399. 1993.
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138Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and NetaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 490-508. 2009.No Abstract
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100The logic of common nouns: an investigation in quantified modal logicYale University Press. 1980.
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720Conditionals in Theories of TruthJournal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1): 27-63. 2017.We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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70Replies to Selim Berker and Karl SchaferPhilosophical Studies 152 (1). 2011.I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliabilit…Read more
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4Précis of Empiricism and ExperiencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |