Anil Gupta

This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning.

I defend Reformed Empiricism against the following objections: (i) that it institutes a veil of perception; (ii) that it fails to secure singular reference in perceptual situations; (iii) that it leads to an erroneous view of science; (iv) that it fails to account for perceptual error and for phenomenology and for rational revision of view; (v) that it is incomplete, that it needs to be supplemented with a theory of truth; (vi) that an argument offered against the propositional given would, if sound, work against it also.

This chapter consists of five exchanges between Annalisa Coliva, Anil Gupta, and Crispin Wright. These philosophers debate a wide range of issues including (i) whether perceptual judgments presuppose general hinge propositions (e.g., “External objects are, by and large, as they appear to be”); (ii) whether the justification of perceptual judgments requires that the hinge propositions be justified; (iii) whether the idea of hinge proposition helps address skeptical arguments; and (iv) which skeptical arguments deserve a constructive response and which deserve to be dismissed as fallacious.

This chapter argues that classical empiricism offers a striking approach to the problem of empiricism and experience—an approach that occupied center stage in epistemology for about 300 years but which has been the subject of incessant attacks since about the middle of the 20th century. It acknowledges the problems that classical empiricism faces, which are serious and seem to be insoluble within the confines of classical assumptions. Although classical empiricism is indeed fundamentally flawed, the chapter highlights some of its virtues.

This chapter develops an account of experience and knowledge that takes seriously the interdependence of our conceptions of the self and the world. It argues that without an adequate conception of the world, we cannot have an adequate conception of the self. And, conversely, without an adequate conception of the self, we cannot have an adequate conception of the world. We do not begin our inquiry with adequate conceptions of the self and the world; it is rather the goal of inquiry to furnish us with such conceptions. The account of experience and knowledge that respects these facts is given.

This chapter presents a synthesis of the preceding discussions and some concluding thoughts. The book is built around the idea that of the interdependence of perceptual judgments and view. The rationality of our view depends upon the rationality of our perceptual judgments, and the rationality of our perceptual judgments depends in turn upon the rationality of our view. This interdependence is not a threat to the unconditional rationality of our view and perceptual judgments. Rather, it provides the best route to understanding this rationality. The interdependence dictates that the given in an experience is hypothetical, not propositional. The present proposal respects both the Multiple-Factorizability of Experience and the Insight of Empiricism. By acknowledging the invariable interdependence of perceptual judgments and view, it respects the idea of Multiple-Factorizability. By recognizing experience to be the force behind the rational dynamics of views, it accommodates the Insight of Empiricism.