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42Philosophy and the Brain SciencesIris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 1 (2): 353-374. 2009.What are the differences between philosophy and science, or between the methods of philosophy and the methods of science? Unlike some philosophers we do not find philosophy and the methods of philosophy to be sui generis. Science, and in particular neuroscience, has much to tell us about the nature of the world and the concepts that we must use to understand and explain it. Yet science cannot function well without reflective analysis of the concepts, methods, and practices that constitute it. Fo…Read more
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1702Thinking about mechanismsPhilosophy of Science 67 (1): 1-25. 2000.The concept of mechanism is analyzed in terms of entities and activities, organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Examples show how mechanisms work in neurobiology and molecular biology. Thinking in terms of mechanisms provides a new framework for addressing many traditional philosophical issues: causality, laws, explanation, reduction, and scientific change
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7For Philosophy of Science, and European Cultural Center of Delphi. The topic of the symposium, convened at the European Cultural Center of Delphi, was Forms of Proof and Demonstration in Philosophy and Science. These symposia are held every two years in Greece in recognition of Athens as the birthplace of Western philosophy (all of them supported by (review)Perspectives on Science 12 (3): 243-243. 2004.
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Scientific controversies: An introductionIn Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 3--17. 2000.
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31The challenge of psychiatric nosology and diagnosisJournal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (3): 704-709. 2012.
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10PrefaceIn J. E. McGuire & Peter Machamer (eds.), Descartes's Changing Mind, Princeton University Press. 2009.
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3Chapter four. Body-body causation and the cartesian world of matterIn J. E. McGuire & Peter Machamer (eds.), Descartes's Changing Mind, Princeton University Press. pp. 111-163. 2009.
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Neuroscience, learning and the return to behaviorismIn John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience, Oxford University Press. pp. 166--178. 2009.
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11The Dispositions of DescartescIn Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 69-78. 2009.
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36Knowing causes: Descartes on the world of matterPhilosophica 76 (2). 2005.In this essay, we discuss how Descartes arrives at his mature view of material causation. Descartes position changes over time in some very radical ways. The last section spells out his final position as to how causation works in the world of material objects. When considering Descartes causal theories, it is useful to distinguish between vertical and horizontal causation. The vertical perspective addresses Gods relation to creation. God is essential being, and every being other than God …Read more
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33Review of Barry C. Smith (ed.), Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine; and, Wine and Philosophy: A Symposium on Thinking and Drinking (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4). 2008.
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54Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2012.One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, concentrating on the wa…Read more
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4Chapter two. God and efficient causationIn J. E. McGuire & Peter Machamer (eds.), Descartes's Changing Mind, Princeton University Press. pp. 36-81. 2009.
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24A recent drawing of the theory/observation distinctionPhilosophy of Science 38 (3): 413-414. 1971.James Cornman has recently offered a definition for ‘observation term’ which he takes to meet most, if not all, of the standard objections to such definitions. He also employs this definition against certain materialists, but in what follows I wish only to address myself to the proposed definition. I shall argue that he has failed to show any logical difference between “observation terms,” as he defines them, and terms which are not so classified. I shall show that his definition is too restrict…Read more
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Aesthetics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
General Philosophy of Science |