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27Evolution of moralityIn John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. pp. 3. 2010.
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27Exploring the Folkbiological Conception of Human NaturePhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 366 (1563): 444. 2011.Integrating the study of human diversity into the human evolutionary sciences requires substantial revision of traditional conceptions of a shared human nature. This process may be made more difficult by entrenched, 'folkbiological' modes of thought. Earlier work by the authors suggests that biologically naive subjects hold an implicit theory according to which some traits are expressions of an animal's inner nature while others are imposed by its environment. In this paper, we report further st…Read more
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26The reification objection to bottom-up cognitive ontology revisionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.
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26This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
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26Is evidence of language-like properties evidence of a language-of-thought architecture?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.We argue that Quilty-Dunn et al.'s commitment to representational pluralism undermines their case for the language-of-thought hypothesis as the evidence they present is consistent with the operation of the other representational formats that they are willing to accept.
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25In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
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25Truetemp cooled down: The stability of Truetemp intuitionsSynthese 201 (3): 1-19. 2023.In this paper, we report the results of three high-powered replication studies in experimental philosophy, which bear on an alleged instability of folk philosophical intuitions: the purported susceptibility of epistemic intuitions about the Truetemp case (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge. Westview Press, Boulder, 1990) to order effects. Evidence for this susceptibility was first reported by Swain et al. (Philos Phenomenol Res 76(1):138–155, 2008); further evidence was then found in two studies by Wri…Read more
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24Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (edited book)Routledge. 2014.<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’…Read more
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24The Compositionality of Meaning and Content. Volume I - Foundational Issues, (edited book)De Gruyter. 2005.Representational systems such as language, mind and perhaps even the brain exhibit a structure that is often assumed to be compositional. That is, the semantic value of a complex representation is determined by the semantic value of their parts and the way they are put together. Dating back to the late 19th century, the principle of compositionality has regained wide attention recently. Since the principle has been dealt with very differently across disciplines, the aim of the two volumes is to …Read more
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24Doing without concepts by Edouard Machery * by Edouard Machery (review)Analysis 70 (1): 186-188. 2010.The title and blurb suggest that this book makes a case for eliminating concepts. The suggestion is misleading, however. What Machery really does is multiply them.Here is his characterization of what concepts are. He says that a concept is ‘a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements about x’. He holds that people represent categories…Read more
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23A better philosophy for a better psychology: Comment on Slaney and Racine (2011)Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31 (2): 90-95. 2011.In their thought-provoking article, Slaney and Racine put forth several criticisms of the traditional view that concepts are mental representations used in the cognitive processes that underlie human higher cognitive competences . Considerations of a broadly Wittgensteinian nature underlie their criticisms. In this article, I argue that the considerations advanced by Slaney and Racine do not undermine the clear account of the nature of mental states and psychological processes developed in the 1…Read more
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23Precis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4): 581-584. 2019.Volume 27, Issue 4, October 2019, Page 581-584.
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23Robot pains and corporate feelingsThe Philosophers' Magazine 52 78-82. 2011.Most philosophers of mind follow Thomas Nagel and hold that subjective experiences are characterised by the fact that there is “something it is like” to have them. Philosophers of mind have sometimes speculated that ordinary people endorse, perhaps implicitly, this conception of subjective experiences. Some recent findings cast doubt on this view.
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22Response to Janet Levin and Michael StrevensPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 246-255. 2019.
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21Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century is a fine collection of essays edited by António Zilhão. Most of the essays are written by prominent philosophers of biology and psychology, while a roboticist, Inman Harvey, and a psychologist, Barbara Tversky, complete the list of contributors. Eight of the nine essays are original, although several of the essays are partly made up of material published elsewhere. Most of these articles belong to a growing …Read more
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18Response to Chris Crandall and John SymonsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (5): 615-630. 2022.ABSTRACT This article responds to Chris Crandall's and John Symons's critical discussions of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. I examine the significance of experimental-philosophy research for philosophy and for psychology and discuss the methodological shortcomings of experimental philosophy. I also consider how we can come to know metaphysical necessities of philosophical importance and defend a pragmatist take on conceptual engineering.
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18Review of António Zilhão (ed.), Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4). 2006.
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14On the relevance of folk intuitions: A commentary on Talbot ☆Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 654-660. 2012.In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
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14Evidence for distinct contributions of form and motion information to the recognition of emotions from body gesturesCognition 104 (1): 59-72. 2007.
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12Culture and cognitionIn E. Margolis, R. Samuels & S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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8100 years of psychology of concepts: The theoretical notion of concept and its operationalizationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1): 63-84. 2005.
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7Describing a person as knowing a proposition involves a rich array of abilities: psychological capacities to attribute mental states to others, linguistic competence with mental state verbs, conceptual grasp of the nature of knowledge and its relation to features such as reliability and evidence. One might wonder whether these abilities are all part of our natural endowment as human beings, or whether any of them is a product of a person's specific cultural context. This one-day workshop brings …Read more
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7Natasha Mitchell: This is All in the Mind on Radio National abc.net.au/rn I'm Natasha Mitchell and really this past fortnight has been hellish for Australia, the bushfires in Victoria have claimed hundreds of human lives and it's almost been impossible to comprehend the scale of the disaster. Today's show links in a small way to the debate now being waged over what, or who, causes bushfires. It's a discussion about the philosophy of intentions and their profound moral weight
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4A better philosophy for a better psychology: Comment on Slaney and Racine (2011)Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31 (2): 90-95. 2011.
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University of PittsburghHistory and Philosophy of Science
Center for Philosophy of ScienceDistinguished Professor
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |