-
124Creating Scientific Concepts, by Nancy J. NersessianMind 119 (475): 838-844. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
-
3692The Ship of Theseus PuzzleIn Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3, Oxford University Press. pp. 158-174. 2020.Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-t…Read more
-
48Précis of Philosophy Within Its Proper BoundsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 221-229. 2019.
-
22Response to Janet Levin and Michael StrevensPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 246-255. 2019.
-
25In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
-
44Beyond mind–body dualism: embracing pluralism in psychiatric research—introduction to the special issue, “Psychiatry and Its Philosophy”Synthese 196 (6): 2111-2115. 2019.The special issue, “Psychiatry and Its Philosophy,” focuses on addressing the mindbrain dualism and connected problems in the clinical and scientific contexts of psychiatry. Authors in this special issue address the theoretical disagreements that are manifest in the clinical and scientific goals of psychiatry and explore the possibility of reconciling the claim that research on psychopathology needs to be scientific with the claim that it needs to address the needs of patients in the clinic. Our…Read more
-
46Do the folk need a meta-ethics?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41. 2018.Stanford argues that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms. We first challenge the moral/non-moral distinction that frames Stanford's discussion. We then argue that to the extent that norms are objectified (and we hold that they are at most objectified in a very thin sense), it is not for the sake of achieving correlated interaction.
-
357Expertise and Intuitions about ReferenceTheoria 27 (1): 37-54. 2012.Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.
-
158Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to DevittTheoria 27 (2): 223-227. 2012.In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.
-
57Is psychological essentialism an inherent feature of human cognition?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (5): 499-499. 2014.Recent evidence shows that psychological essentialism is neither a universal nor stable feature of human cognition. The extent to which people report essentialist intuitions varies enormously across cultures and education levels, and is also influenced by subtle, normatively irrelevant contextual manipulations. These results challenge the notion that the human mind is “fitted” with a built-in inherence heuristic that produces essentialist intuitions.
-
90Philosophy Within its Proper BoundsOxford University Press. 2017.In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors, such as the analysis of concepts.
-
90Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-MentalizingThought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 193-203. 2017.Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregard…Read more
-
24Doing without concepts by Edouard Machery * by Edouard Machery (review)Analysis 70 (1): 186-188. 2010.The title and blurb suggest that this book makes a case for eliminating concepts. The suggestion is misleading, however. What Machery really does is multiply them.Here is his characterization of what concepts are. He says that a concept is ‘a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements about x’. He holds that people represent categories…Read more
-
180Debunking Adapting Minds (review)Philosophy of Science 73 (2): 232-246. 2006.David Buller’s recent book, _Adapting Minds_, is a philosophical critique of the field of evolutionary psychology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology is utterly bankrupt from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Although _Adapting Minds _has been well received in both the academic press and the popular media, we argue that Buller’s critique of evolutionary psychology fails
-
14On the relevance of folk intuitions: A commentary on Talbot ☆Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 654-660. 2012.In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
-
219Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6): 830-830. 2005.We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong
-
842Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-MentalizingThought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 193-203. 2017.Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subjects assertion that p matches her non-verbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from nearly 6,000 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we suggest that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first ta…Read more
-
93How to Split Concepts: A Reply to Piccinini and ScottPhilosophy of Science 73 (4): 410-418. 2006.In “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind” (2005), I argued that the notion of concept in psychology and in neuropsychology fails to pick out a natural kind. Piccinini and Scott (2006, in this issue) have criticized the argument I used to support this conclusion. They also proposed two alternative arguments for a similar conclusion. In this reply, I rebut Piccinini and Scott’s main objection against the argument proposed in “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind.” Moreover, I show that the two alternative a…Read more
-
37The heterogeneity of knowledge representation and the elimination of conceptBehavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 231-244. 2010.In this response, I begin by defending and clarifying the notion of concept proposed in Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) against the alternatives proposed by several commentators. I then discuss whether psychologists and philosophers who theorize about concepts are talking about distinct phenomena or about different aspects of the same phenomenon, as argued in some commentaries. Next, I criticize the idea that the cognitive-scientific findings about induction, categorization, concept combin…Read more
-
96The intuitive is a red herringInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4): 403-419. 2017.In this article, we discuss critically some of the key themes in Max Deutsch’s excellent book, The Myth of the Intuitive. We focus in particular on the shortcomings of his historical analysis – a missed opportunity by our lights, on the claim that philosophers present arguments in support of the judgments elicited by thought experiments, and on the claim that experimental philosophy is only relevant for the methodology of philosophy if thought experiments elicit intuitions.
-
50In Why we Talk, cognitive scientist Jean-Louis Dessalles presents an original, in-depth account of the nature and evolution of human language. Written in a clear and engaging manner, Why we Talk is an impressive achievement. Dessalles reviews and contributes to most controversies about human language. He compares human language to other systems of communication found in the animal world, arguing for the originality of the former; he clearly shows that language is a biological trait and that we s…Read more
-
249Social construction and the concept of racePhilosophy of Science 72 (5): 1208-1219. 2005.There has been little serious work to integrate the constructionist approach and the cognitive approach in the domain of race, although many researchers have paid lip service to this project. We believe that any satisfactory account of human beings’ racialist cognition has to integrate both approaches. In this paper, we propose a step toward this integration. We present an evolutionary theory that rests on a distinction between various kinds of groups (kin-based groups, small-scale coalitions an…Read more
-
403 Please specify whether it is Meaney (2001a or 2001b) throughout the article. 4 Please provide location of the publisher for reference Ariew (2006). 5 Please update the following reference: Griffiths et al. (submitted); Jones..
-
31Review of Robert Boyd, Peter J.Richerson, The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7). 2005.no abstract.
-
University of PittsburghHistory and Philosophy of Science
Center for Philosophy of ScienceDistinguished Professor
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |