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112Explaining why experimental behavior varies across cultures: A missing step in “The weirdest people in the world?”Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 101-102. 2010.In this commentary, I argue that to properly assess the significance of the cross-cultural findings reviewed by Henrich et al., one needs to understand better the causes of the variation in performance in experimental tasks across cultures
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313The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issuesMind and Language 23 (2). 2008.Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action canno…Read more
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University of PittsburghHistory and Philosophy of Science
Center for Philosophy of ScienceDistinguished Professor
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| General Philosophy of Science |