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Edouard Machery

University of Pittsburgh
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    212
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    36
  •  News and Updates
    163

 More details
  • University of Pittsburgh
    History and Philosophy of Science
    Center for Philosophy of Science
    Distinguished Professor
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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
General Philosophy of Science
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (212)
  •  112
    Explaining why experimental behavior varies across cultures: A missing step in “The weirdest people in the world?”
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 101-102. 2010.
    In this commentary, I argue that to properly assess the significance of the cross-cultural findings reviewed by Henrich et al., one needs to understand better the causes of the variation in performance in experimental tasks across cultures
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
  •  313
    The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues
    Mind and Language 23 (2). 2008.
    Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action canno…Read more
    Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, defl ationary interpretation of these experimental fi ndings, ‘ the trade-off hypothesis ’ , and I present several new experimental fi ndings that support this interpretation.
    Experimental Philosophy: Intentional ActionIntentional ActionFolk Concepts and Folk IntuitionsThe Na…Read more
    Experimental Philosophy: Intentional ActionIntentional ActionFolk Concepts and Folk IntuitionsThe Nature of Folk Psychology
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