-
342Concepts are not a natural kindPhilosophy of Science 72 (3): 444-467. 2005.In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings.
-
698Love and Power: Grau and Pury (2014) as a Case Study in the Challenges of X-Phi ReplicationReview of Philosophy and Psychology (4): 1-17. 2020.Grau and Pury (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 155–168, 2014) reported that people’s views about love are related to their views about reference. This surprising effect was however not replicated in Cova et al.’s (in press) replication study. In this article, we show that the replication failure is probably due to the replication’s low power and that a metaanalytic reanalysis of the result in Cova et al. suggests that the effect reported in Grau and Pury is real. We then report a large, …Read more
-
167You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of ThoughtBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3): 469-485. 2005.The question, ‘Is cognition linguistic?' divides recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I c…Read more
-
37Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4): 608-623. 2019.I am extremely grateful to Mikio Akagi, Nick Hughes, and Alison Springle for their insightful and challenging comments on Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (Machery 2017). In this response, I wil...
-
23Precis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4): 581-584. 2019.Volume 27, Issue 4, October 2019, Page 581-584.
-
32Exploring the Folkbiological Conception of Human NaturePhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 366 (1563): 444. 2011.Integrating the study of human diversity into the human evolutionary sciences requires substantial revision of traditional conceptions of a shared human nature. This process may be made more difficult by entrenched, 'folkbiological' modes of thought. Earlier work by the authors suggests that biologically naive subjects hold an implicit theory according to which some traits are expressions of an animal's inner nature while others are imposed by its environment. In this paper, we report further st…Read more
-
25The Compositionality of Meaning and Content. Volume I - Foundational Issues, (edited book)De Gruyter. 2005.Representational systems such as language, mind and perhaps even the brain exhibit a structure that is often assumed to be compositional. That is, the semantic value of a complex representation is determined by the semantic value of their parts and the way they are put together. Dating back to the late 19th century, the principle of compositionality has regained wide attention recently. Since the principle has been dealt with very differently across disciplines, the aim of the two volumes is to …Read more
-
29The reification objection to bottom-up cognitive ontology revisionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.
-
40The Alpha WarReview of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1): 75-99. 2019.Benjamin et al. Nature Human Behavior 2, 6–10 proposed decreasing the significance level by an order of magnitude to improve the replicability of psychology. This modest, practical proposal has been widely criticized, and its prospects remain unclear. This article defends this proposal against these criticisms and highlights its virtues.
-
43Variation in Intuitions about Reference and Ontological DisagreementsIn Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Semantics, Cross ‐ Cultural Style Metalinguistic and Linguistic Intuitions Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference The Vacuity of Ontological Disagreements Conclusion References.
-
The concept of intentional action in high-functioning autismIn Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 152-172. 2014.
-
40The normative sense: What is universal? What Varies?In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.The extent to which normative cognition varies across cultures has implications for a number of important philosophical questions. This chapter examines several striking commonalities and differences in normative cognition across cultures. We focus on cross-cultural commonality and difference in norm typologies (especially the moral-conventional distinction); the externalization of norms; which aspects of life are normativized; and some of the concepts and principles associated with the normativ…Read more
-
48A deterministic worldview promotes approval of state paternalismJournal of Experimental Social Psychology 70 251-259. 2017.The proper limit to paternalist regulation of citizens' private lives is a recurring theme in political theory and ethics. In the present study, we examine the role of beliefs about free will and determinism in attitudes toward libertarian versus paternalist policies. Throughout five studies we find that a scientific deterministic worldview reduces opposition toward paternalist policies, independent of the putative influence of political ideology. We suggest that exposure to scientific explanati…Read more
-
62Creating Scientific Concepts, by Nancy J. NersessianMind 119 (475): 838-844. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
-
3825The Ship of Theseus PuzzleIn Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 158-174. 2014.Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-t…Read more
-
51Précis of Philosophy Within Its Proper BoundsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 221-229. 2019.
-
23Response to Janet Levin and Michael StrevensPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 246-255. 2019.
-
25In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
-
46Beyond mind–body dualism: embracing pluralism in psychiatric research—introduction to the special issue, “Psychiatry and Its Philosophy”Synthese 196 (6): 2111-2115. 2019.The special issue, “Psychiatry and Its Philosophy,” focuses on addressing the mindbrain dualism and connected problems in the clinical and scientific contexts of psychiatry. Authors in this special issue address the theoretical disagreements that are manifest in the clinical and scientific goals of psychiatry and explore the possibility of reconciling the claim that research on psychopathology needs to be scientific with the claim that it needs to address the needs of patients in the clinic. Our…Read more
-
47Do the folk need a meta-ethics?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41. 2018.Stanford argues that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms. We first challenge the moral/non-moral distinction that frames Stanford's discussion. We then argue that to the extent that norms are objectified (and we hold that they are at most objectified in a very thin sense), it is not for the sake of achieving correlated interaction.
-
130Expertise and Intuitions about ReferenceTheoria 27 (1): 37-54. 2012.Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.
-
30Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to DevittTheoria 27 (2): 223-227. 2012.In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.
-
60Is psychological essentialism an inherent feature of human cognition?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (5): 499-499. 2014.Recent evidence shows that psychological essentialism is neither a universal nor stable feature of human cognition. The extent to which people report essentialist intuitions varies enormously across cultures and education levels, and is also influenced by subtle, normatively irrelevant contextual manipulations. These results challenge the notion that the human mind is “fitted” with a built-in inherence heuristic that produces essentialist intuitions.
-
92Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming more morally permissible?Cognition 170 (C): 95-101. 2018.A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (…Read more
-
91Philosophy Within its Proper BoundsOxford University Press. 2017.In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors, such as the analysis of concepts.
-
82Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-MentalizingThought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 193-203. 2017.Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregard…Read more
-
University of PittsburghHistory and Philosophy of Science
Center for Philosophy of ScienceDistinguished Professor
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |